Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith

Abstract

In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47: [43][44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56] 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane's event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane's theory and I explain Griffith's critique of it. I argue that Griffith's criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane's view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith's objections.Keywords Free will . Responsibility . Libertarianism . Robert Kane . Meghan Griffith Determinism is the view that every event that occurs, including human decisions and actions, is necessitated by earlier events and the laws of nature. So, for instance, according to determinism the words and phrases that I use to express myself right now as I write this essay are chosen by me due to mental processes and events that occur as they do because they are determined by prior events and those events were in turn necessitated by even earlier events and so on. Compatibilists believe that determinism is compatible with the existence of human freedom and responsibility. That is, even if all events in the universe are necessitated by earlier events then we can still exhibit freedom in our decisions, choices, and actions and we can still be responsible for them. Libertarians, on the other hand, believe in the existence of human freedom and responsibility, but they believe it is inconsistent with determinism. According to libertarians, if there is human freedom and responsibility, then at least some of the decisions, choices, and actions we commit must not be necessitated by earlier events.

Historical Moral Responsibility: Is the Infinite Regress Problem Fatal?

“…But Lemos objects that this is too stringent a condition for self‐determination: ‘Even if an agent does not control the contrastive fact that he does A instead of B, he may still be in control of A‐ing when he does A because (1) prior to A‐ing he willed to A while he knew (or should have known) that he might consequently end up A‐ing and (2) had he not willed to A he would not end up A‐ing. Further, this control of his A‐ing establishes his responsibility for A‐ing’ (, p. 366). It is sufficient for non‐luck, in other words, if we can explain why an agent As, even if we cannot explain why he As rather than Bs…”