Kant and the Capacity to Judge

Longuenesse, Béatrice

doi:10.1515/9780691214122

Cited by 674 publications

(25 citation statements)

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“…First, p and ∼p must be incompatible. 32 Second, ∼p must be the most general proposition that is incompatible with p: 33 for any q, if p and q are incompatible, then q must entail ∼p.…”

Section: Minimal Requirements On a Kantian Negation Operatormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But "Jill supports Barnet" (b) cannot be the negation of "Jill supports Arsenal" (a) because it is too specific. The negation ∼a of "Jill supports Arsenal" is the 31 33 Kant makes this precise claim in [Jäsche Logic §49]: "one of [a pair of contrary judgements] says more . .…”

Section: Minimal Requirements On a Kantian Negation Operatormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…How exactly this goes has been interpreted in many different ways. See, for example,[9,27,28,33,45, 47]. For our own preferred interpretation, implemented in the aforementioned computer model, see[16,17].…”

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confidence: 99%

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Formalizing Kant’s Rules

2019

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This paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the rule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a Kantian rule is a general procedure, represented by a conditional imperative or permissive, indicating which acts must or may be performed, given certain acts that are already being performed. These acts are not propositions; they do not have truth-values. Our formalization is related to the input/ output logics, a family of logics designed to capture relations between elements that need not have truth-values. In this paper, we introduce KL 3 as a formalization of Kant's conception of rules as conditional imperatives and permissives. We explain how it differs from standard input/output logics, geometric logic, and firstorder logic, as well as how it translates natural language sentences not well captured by first-order logic. Finally, we show how the various distinctions in Kant's muchmaligned Table of Judgements emerge as the most natural way of dividing up the various types and sub-types of rule in KL 3. Our analysis sheds new light on the way in which normative notions play a fundamental role in the conception of logic at the heart of Kant's theoretical philosophy.

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Section: Minimal Requirements On a Kantian Negation Operatormentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Minimal Requirements On a Kantian Negation Operatormentioning

confidence: 99%

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Formalizing Kant’s Rules

2019

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“…Indeed, earlier than Herbart, the basic idea can be found in Wolff and Leibniz, 76 and is was at least implicit in Kant's transcendental logic. 77 And as for the more general strategy of "transformative analysis" modelled on it, while the new logic provided a way of making this type of logical reparsing of judgment forms explicit, the principle behind it was not novel. Indeed, recently, Angelica Nuzzo has suggested a reading of Hegel's logic as an "analytic" programme for the "clarification and revision of language-both of ordinary language and the language of traditional logic and metaphysics".…”

Section: Russell'srevolutionaryamnesiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Hegel’s Anticipation of the Early History of Analytic Philosophy

Redding¹

2011

Owl of Minerva

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“…As discussed by Longuenesse (1998), Kant takes as his starting point the transcendental question, "What are the a priori conditions for the representations of objects in general? ", and reconfigures the logic of his time so as to render it useful for his transcendental project.…”

Section: Catarina Dutilh Novaesmentioning

confidence: 99%