Kant and the Normativity of Logic

Lu‐Adler, Huaping

doi:10.1111/ejop.12242

Cited by 30 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…37 I do not take a stand here on whether constitutive conditions can also be thought of as normative. For discussion, see Tolley 2006, Lu-Adler 2017, Pollok 2017. An important issue in this debate concerns whether it makes sense to describe some X as subject to some norm Y if it is the case that X cannot fail to accord with Y (see Tolley 2006, 375).…”

Section: Began By Noting That Synthesis Of Empirical Intuitions Essen...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Is it the Understanding or the Imagination that Synthesizes?

Sethi

2022

Kant-Studien

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A common reading of Kant’s notion of synthesis takes it to be carried out by the imagination in a manner guided by the concepts of the understanding. I point to a significant problem for this reading: it is the reproductive imagination that carries out the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction, and Kant claims repeatedly that the reproductive imagination is governed solely by its own laws of association. In light of this, I argue for a different division of the labor of synthesis between the imagination and the understanding. On my view, while the reproductive imagination puts representations together in accordance with laws of association, the understanding recognizes (some of) these combinations of representations as necessary in virtue of corresponding to a connection in the objects represented. I conclude by suggesting that a virtue of my account is that it can make sense of Kant’s claim that the relational categories are merely regulative for intuitions.

show abstract

Section: Began By Noting That Synthesis Of Empirical Intuitions Essen...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Is it the Understanding or the Imagination that Synthesizes?

Sethi

2022

Kant-Studien

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…3 A rich debate testifies the important role played by Kant as source of inspiration for the discussion on the normativity of logic. See at least MacFarlane (2000), Tolley (2006) and (2007), Leech (2017), Lu-Adler (2017. Conant (1991) has also stimulated new attention for Kant's logic with his thoughts on logical aliens, which Nunez (2019) discusses with reference to Kant.…”

Section: Notas / Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On rules of inference in Kant’s logic

Rosa

2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

O artigo trata do estatuto normativo da lógica geral de Kant com referência às inferências da razão. Especial atenção é dada aos modos silogísticos indiretos das segunda e terceira figuras e às regras correspondentes. A conclusão avalia se e como tais regras restringem o pensamento com respeito ao uso lógico da faculdade da razão. Recebido / Received: 26 de junho 2020 / 26 June 2020Aceito / Accepted: 5 de julho de 2020 / 5 July 2020

show abstract

“…On how the contemporary, schematic view of logic differs in fundamental ways from the universalist conception held by Frege and Russell, seeGoldfarb (1979Goldfarb ( , 2001.5 MacFarlane's reading of Kant and Frege is controversial. On Kant, seeTolley (2006) andLu-Adler (2017). For an overview of the literature on Frege and the normativity of logic, seeMezzadri (2015).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Husserl and the normativity of logic

Huang

2023

The Southern J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article, I analyze the evolution of Husserl's view on the normativity of logic and the corresponding changes in his phenomenological analysis of judgment. Initially, in the Prolegomena, Husserl claimed that the laws of pure logic are ideal and acquire normative status only as a result of application. Later, however, he revised this position and claimed that the same laws are at once ideal and normative. Sections 1 and 2 present textual evidence for attributing such a change of position to Husserl, which is not generally acknowledged in the literature. Section 3 critically examines Husserl's early position, with specific attention to the model of instantiation. Sections 4–6 identify three key stages in the development of Husserl's theory of judgment that lead to the normative conception of pure logic: (1) the critique of the dissociation of ideal content and assertive force; (2) the rejection of the instantiation model of proposition and the development of a new account in terms of identification; (3) the genetic‐phenomenological interpretation of proposition and the elaboration of the three‐layer structure of pure logic.

show abstract

Kant and the Normativity of Logic

Cited by 30 publications

References 11 publications

Is it the Understanding or the Imagination that Synthesizes?

Is it the Understanding or the Imagination that Synthesizes?

On rules of inference in Kant’s logic

Husserl and the normativity of logic

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About