Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck

Hartman, Robert J.

doi:10.1111/misp.12109

Cited by 7 publications

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“…In concert with my recent work that Kant's moral philosophy does not rule out moral luck in consequences (Hartman, 2019a; see also Moran, 2019), this paper about circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in Kant's moral philosophy provides even more reason to challenge the received view that Kant's moral philosophy obviously rules out moral luck, which can provide contemporary Kantian philosophers an occasion to re-check their reasons about why they deny moral luck. 8 ORCID Robert J. Hartman https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5115-7636 ENDNOTES (Korsgaard, 1996:173), neither standpoint can be subordinated to the other (Korsgaard, 1996:173), and it cannot sensibly be asked how they relate (Korsgaard, 1992:317-318).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 63%

“…I have argued that there is a plausible interpretation according to which Kant embraces circumstantial and constitutive moral luck, and this interpretation is consistent even with a robust libertarian interpretation of Kant on free will. In concert with my recent work that Kant's moral philosophy does not rule out moral luck in consequences (Hartman, 2019a; see also Moran, 2019), this paper about circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in Kant's moral philosophy provides even more reason to challenge the received view that Kant's moral philosophy obviously rules out moral luck, which can provide contemporary Kantian philosophers an occasion to re‐check their reasons about why they deny moral luck 8…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 67%

“…InHartman (2019a), I argue that Kant does not deny that lucky consequences can affect how much praise or blame a person deserves (see alsoMoran, 2019).2 The standard definition of "luck" in "moral luck" is the lack of control definition of luck(Hartman, 2017:23). For a defense of this standard definition, seeHartman (2017:23-31),Anderson (2019), andStatman (2019); for an argument against it, seeLevy (2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…1 1 In Hartman (2019a), I argue that Kant does not deny that lucky consequences can affect how much praise or blame a person deserves (see also Moran, 2019). …”

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Circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in Kant's moral philosophy

Hartman

2023

European J of Philosophy

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The received view of Kant's moral philosophy is that it precludes all moral luck. But I offer a plausible interpretation according to which Kant embraces moral luck in circumstance and constitution. I interpret the unconditioned nature of transcendental freedom as a person's ability to do the right thing no matter how she is inclined by her circumstantial and constitutive luck. I argue that various passages about degrees of difficulty relating to circumstantial and constitutive luck provide a reason to accept a pro-moral luck interpretation of Kant.The received view in the moral luck literature, and elsewhere, is that Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy rules out the possibility of moral luck. "Kant's moral philosophy is one of grandest attempts in Western philosophy to banish any form of luck from the realm of morality" (Vaida, 2014:124); "the Kantian [moral] position is presented as entirely

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 63%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 67%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 1 In Hartman (2019a), I argue that Kant does not deny that lucky consequences can affect how much praise or blame a person deserves (see also Moran, 2019). …”

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confidence: 99%

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Circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in Kant's moral philosophy

Hartman

2023

European J of Philosophy

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“…Though some have insisted that even Kant ultimately does not deny that moral action is subject to contingent empirical determination; seeHeyd (1997) andHartman (2019).…”

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The essential superficiality of the voluntary and the moralization of psychology

Queloz

2021

Philos Stud

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Is the idea of the voluntary important? Those who think so tend to regard it as an idea that can be metaphysically deepened through a theory about voluntary action, while those who think it a superficial idea that cannot coherently be deepened tend to neglect it as unimportant. Parting company with both camps, I argue that the idea of the voluntary is at once important and superficial—it is an essentially superficial notion that performs important functions, but can only perform them if we refrain from deepening it. After elaborating the contrast between superficial and deepened ideas of the voluntary, I identify the important functions that the superficial idea performs in relation to demands for fairness and freedom. I then suggest that theories trying to deepen the idea exemplify a problematic moralization of psychology—they warp psychological ideas to ensure that moral demands can be met. I offer a three-tier model of the problematic dynamics this creates, and show why the pressure to deepen the idea should be resisted. On this basis, I take stock of what an idea of the voluntary worth having should look like, and what residual tensions with moral ideas this leaves us with.

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Free Will and Moral Luck

Hartman¹

2023

A Companion to Free Will

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Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck

Cited by 7 publications

References 62 publications

Circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in Kant's moral philosophy

Circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in Kant's moral philosophy

The essential superficiality of the voluntary and the moralization of psychology

Free Will and Moral Luck

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