Kant, Kästner and the Distinction between Metaphysical and Geometric Space

Onof, Christian; Schulting, Dennis

doi:10.1017/s1369415414000065

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Sensibilist views are expressed by e.g. Allison 2000, Falkenstein 1995, McLear 2015, Messina 2014, Onof and Schulting 2014, 2015 5 What I am presenting here is a general position. Nevertheless, I take it as correct to say that variants of this position have been expressed by Bauer 2012, Henrich 1969, McDowell 2009: esp.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 86%

Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities

Raysmith¹

2021

Kantian rev.

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In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to make incompatible claims regarding the unitary natures of what he takes to be our a priori representations of space and time. I argue that these representations are unitary independently of all synthesis and explain how this avoids problems encountered by other positions regarding the Transcendental Deduction and its relation to the Transcendental Aesthetic in that work. Central is the claim that these representations (1) contain, when characterized as intuitions and considered as prior to any affections of sensibility, only an infinitude of merely possible finite spatial and temporal representations, and (2) are representations that are merely transcendental grounds for the possibilities for receiving or generating finite representations in sensibility that are determined (immediately, in the case of reception) by means of syntheses that accord with the categories.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 86%

Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities

Raysmith¹

2021

Kantian rev.

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“…What matters is rather that we can construct lines and other geometrical figures of arbitrary sizes, which may well all be finite. He thus questions the claim that geometry is only possible if we assume the existence of an infinite space (Onof & Schulting 2014).…”

Section: Answering (Q 2 ): Possible Partsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptualizing Kant’s Mereology

Marschall¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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In the Resolution of the Second Antinomy of the first Critique and the Dynamics chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences, Kant presents his critical views on mereology, the study of parts and wholes. He endorses an unusual position: Matter is said to be infinitely divisible without being infinitely divided. It would be mistaken to think that matter consists of infinitely many parts-rather, parts "exist only in the representation of them, hence in the dividing". This view, according to which parts are created through division somehow, was criticized as obscure early on, and has not received much attention since. Against this trend, I show how a coherent position, which I call Mereological Conceptualism, can be extracted from the sparse textual basis. There was a time when the dispute respecting monads employed such general attention, and was conducted with so much warmth, that it forced its way into company of every description, that of the guard-room not excepted. There was scarcely a lady at court who did not take a decided part in favour of monads or against them. In a word, all conversation was engrossed by monads-no other subject could find admission. [...] As this controversy has made a great deal of noise, you will not be displeased, undoubtedly, if I dwell a little upon it.

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“…En la Estética trascendental, no obstante, hay varias nociones de espacio en juego. Algunos trabajos recientes han señalado esto con pulcritud y buen tino (v. Onof;Schulting 2015;Tolley 2016). Por un lado, se encuentra la noción de espacio como un tipo de representación, es decir, como intuición a priori, la cual tiene una función específica en la experiencia humana -esto es, como indica Kant, la condición que hace posible para los humanos la experiencia de objetos como fuera de nosotros y como guardando determinadas relaciones mutuas (A23/B38)-.…”

Section: Preliminaresunclassified

Unidad del espacio, mereología y geometría desde la Estética Trascendental

Ochoa¹

2018

REK

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Este trabajo propone que el espacio, para Kant, en la Crítica de la razón pura, posee una unidad propia que es el fundamento de los conceptos espaciales, tanto empíricos como geométricos; esta unidad es intrínseca y se caracteriza por ser antiatómica. La propuesta se defiende en contra de la lectura de la síntesis, según la cual la unidad del espacio es producto de la actividad combinatoria del entendimiento. En la parte final, se extraen algunas consecuencias importantes de esta concepción del espacio para la teoría kantiana de la geometría, según la cual la sensibilidad humana es fuente del conocimiento geométrico.

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Kant, Kästner and the Distinction between Metaphysical and Geometric Space

Cited by 16 publications

References 25 publications

Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities

Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities

Conceptualizing Kant’s Mereology

Unidad del espacio, mereología y geometría desde la Estética Trascendental

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Kant, Kästner and the Distinction between Metaphysical and Geometric Space

Cited by 16 publications

References 25 publications

Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities

Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities

Conceptualizing Kant&#x2019;s Mereology

Unidad del espacio, mereología y geometría desde la Estética Trascendental

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Conceptualizing Kant’s Mereology