Kant, Modality, and the Most Real Being

Abstract

Kant's speculativetheistic proof rests on a distinction between "logical" and "real" modality that he developed very early in the pre-critical period. The only way to explain facts about real possibility, according to Kant, is to appeal to the properties of a unique, necessary, and "most real" being. Here I reconstruct the proof in its historical context, focusing on the role played by the theory of modality both in motivating the argument (in the pre-critical period) and, ultimately, in undoing it as a source of knowledge of God's existence (in the critical period). Along the way I examine Kant's version of the now-popular "actualist" thesis that facts about what is possible must be explained by facts about what is actual. I conclude by discussing why the critical Kant claims both that there are rational grounds for accepting the conclusion of his theistic proof, and that such acceptancecan not count as knowledge. This is important, I argue, because the same considerations ultimately motivate his prohibition on knowledge of things-in-themselves generally.

Kant’s Regulative Metaphysics of God and the Systematic Lawfulness of Nature

“…23 Henceforth OPA. 24 The argument is problematic in various ways as pointed by many commentators; see, for example, Fisher and Watkins 1998, Chignell 2009, Stang 2010, and Boehm 2012. The various problems of the argument are unrelated to my present purposes, the content of the conception of God entailed by the proof and its relation to the Ideal and the regulative principle of the systematicity of nature.…”

Backing into Spinozism

“…(It is easy, but probably incorrect, to conflate Malebranche's appeals to God's wisdom and God's intellect, as I fear I did in Newlands (2013).) 42 Kant's reasons for favoring actual exemplification over mere thinking are more complex than I can get into here; for further discussion, see Adams (2000) and Chignell (2009). 12 0 . If it is really possible that something is extended, then God is extended [PP].…”

“… Kant's reasons for favoring actual exemplification over mere thinking are more complex than I can get into here; for further discussion, see Adams () and Chignell (). …”

The Coextensiveness Thesis andKant's Modal Agnosticism in the ‘Postulates’

“…Recent journal articles and books that directly focus on the subject include Abaci , Rosenkoetter , Kamlah , Chignell , Leech , Stang , Wingendorf , Motta . I will converse with some of these works in this paper.…”

“…‘[T]here is another variety of real repugnance that is subject‐canceling . In these cases, the manner in which two or more predicates are opposed results in a ‘canceling’ not merely of their respective effects, but of the subject itself qua real possibility’ (Chignell : 173).…”