Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness

Guyer, Paul

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173339

Cited by 625 publications

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“…In addition, the state must posit laws that ensure that the poor can work themselves into full independence from other private persons. 5-7;and 2000). All others can enjoy full private independence from one another.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Kant and Dependency Relations: Kant on the State's Right to Redistribute Resources to Protect the Rights of Dependents

Varden

2006

Dialogue

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Contrary to much Kant interpretation, this article argues that Kant's moral philosophy, including his account of charity, is irrelevant to justifying the state's right to redistribute material resources to secure the rights of dependents (the poor, children, and the impaired). The article also rejects the popular view that Kant either does not or cannot justify anything remotely similar to the liberal welfare state. A closer look at Kant's account of dependency relations in "The Doctrine of Right" reveals an argumentative structure sufficient for a public institutional protection of dependents and evidence that Kant identifies concerns of economic justice as lying at the heart of the state's legitimacy. RÉSUMÉ : Au contraire de ce qu'affirment bon nombre d'interprétations, le présent article soutient que la philosophie morale de Kant et ses explications sur la charité ne justifient pas adéquatement le droit de l'État à redistribuer les biens matériels afin de garantir les droits des citoyens non autonomes (les pauvres, les enfants, les handicapés). Cet article rejette aussi l'idée largement diffusée que Kant ne justifie pas ou est incapable de justifier quoi que ce soit s'approchant même vaguement d'un État providence de type libéral. Une lecture attentive aux explications sur les relations de dépendance que l'on trouve dans «La doctrine du droit» dévoile une structure argumentative à même de défendre une institution publique vouée à la protection des citoyens non autonomes et fournit des preuves à l'effet que Kant voit la question de la justice économique comme un élément central de la légitimité de l'État.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…pp. For example, see Guyer (2000), Höffe (1994), Holtman (2004), Kersting (1992aKersting ( , 1992b, Murphy (1994), and Williams (1983). Contemporary Kantian theorists typically build their theories of justice on the assumption that on the Kantian view justice is a remedial virtue.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant and Dependency Relations: Kant on the State's Right to Redistribute Resources to Protect the Rights of Dependents

Varden

2006

Dialogue

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“…Nor is it fair to Kant to imply that because we lack theoretical knowledge of noumenal freedom we thereby lack any legitimate way to regard ourselves as free and must treat the idea as a given (Rose, 1984: 24). Quite the contrary, we have solid practical reasons to regard ourselves as free, such that freedom is fundamental to being a person (Guyer 2000;Ward, 2006).…”

Section: An Elective Affinity Between Kant and Roman Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideology critique via jurisprudence

Latz

2016

Thesis Eleven

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The British social philosopher Gillian Rose developed, in Dialectic of Nihilism, a way of posing the problem of ideology by showing the dependence of philosophical and social thought on historical legal concepts. She termed it 'jurisprudential wisdom' and through it aimed to expose unexamined presuppositions within philosophical consciousness and thereby to perform ideology critique on such consciousness. This article examines Rose's version of ideology critique, first by setting out its context within postKantian thought and Rose's own intellectual project. It then tackles in detail Rose's view that Roman law significantly shapes Kant's form of rationality as a whole. It concludes that her argument is suggestive and highlights important features of Kant's thought, but that it ultimately fails as an ideology critique. It does not follow that Rose's form of ideology critique via jurisprudence fails as a whole; on the contrary, it retains plausibility. Rose's misfire against Kant is a salutary lesson in the dangers of ideology critique and Kant's survival of Rose's attack is important for the assessment of his philosophy.

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“…7. For a discussion of the debate about how exclusive this obligation to the law is for Kant and whether or not inclination has any positive role to play, see Guyer, 2000. Guyer argues for a position in Kant that seems close to that of Levinson's, namely, acting according to the moral law as universal principle but making use of one's naturally-occurring inclinations which are "suitable for and compatible with" the universal (Guyer, 2000, p. 303).…”

Section: Encountering the Worth Of Studentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Rational Autonomy: Levinas and the Incomparable Worth of the Student as Singular Other

Joldersma

2008

Interchange

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This article explores the question: Why are students of worth? Educationally, an answer often involves a Kantian response: They are of worth because they are always ends and never means. This response is usually connected to a notion of autonomy interpreted as individual, rational self-determination. The article argues for a different answer. The essay begins with a recent educational example of construing worth as rational autonomy. Meira Levinson, in her book The Demands of Liberal Education (1999), argues for a version of rational autonomy which is taken in the essay as a Kantian response to the question. The essay then turns to Kant's own understanding of intrinsic human worth as ends. Although the essay agrees in general with the notion of end, it criticizes Kant's version of rational autonomy. Instead, it argues for a notion of worth as irreplaceable singularity. Both the critique of the Kantian answer and the essay's alternative are shaped by the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Here technical notions of "the other," proximity and singularity are brought to bear on the question of human worth. The Levinasian alternative, so the essay argues, better answers the question of student worth by highlighting the incomparability of the student as a singular other.

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Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness

Cited by 625 publications

References 0 publications

Kant and Dependency Relations: Kant on the State's Right to Redistribute Resources to Protect the Rights of Dependents

Kant and Dependency Relations: Kant on the State's Right to Redistribute Resources to Protect the Rights of Dependents

Ideology critique via jurisprudence

Beyond Rational Autonomy: Levinas and the Incomparable Worth of the Student as Singular Other

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