Kant, Real Possibility, and the Threat of Spinoza

Abstract

In the first part of the paper I reconstruct Kant's proof of the existence of a 'most real being' while also highlighting the theory of modality that motivates Kant's departure from Leibniz's version of the proof. I go on to argue that it is precisely this departure that makes the being that falls out of the pre-critical proof look more like Spinoza's extended natura naturans than an independent, personal creator-God. In the critical period, Kant seems to think that transcendental idealism allows him to avoid this conclusion, but in the last section of the paper I argue that there is still one important version of the Spinozistic threat that remains. The possibility of things, which can only be regarded as determinations of a single universal possibility, namely of the highest being, proves the existence of the realissimi as a sum total. Kant, Reflexion 6279, from the mid-1780s (18:545) Spinozism is the true conclusion of dogmatic metaphysics. Kant, Reflexion 6050, from the mid-1780s (18:436) 1 Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes [The Only Possible Basis of a Demonstration of the Existence of God, hereafter 'OPB'] is in the second volume of the Akademie edition. Quotations from Kant's works are translated from Kant 1902-, with the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason cited by the standard [A/B] pagination, and all other works cited by [volume:page]. I have consulted and sometimes used the translations of OPB by Gordon Treash in Kant 1979, and by David Walford in Kant 1992, as well as Paul Guyer and Allen Wood's translation of the first Critique in Kant 1998.

Backing into Spinozism

“… Although I disagree with his objections to Leibniz on behalf of Kant, Andrew Chignell has cogently presented a version of the concern I am raising here about the path from Kant's early theory of modality to Spinozism (Chignell ()). …”

The Relation between God and the World in the Pre-Critical Kant: Was Kant a Spinozist?

“…Chignell, following Adams, presents two ways of grounding possibilities in existence as a contrast between Leibniz and Kant (Adams 2000: 427; Chignell 2012: 643). Leibniz too held the principle that possibility must be grounded in existence 7 .…”

“…According to Adams and Chignell Kant diverges from Leibniz on this last point, as for Kant possibilities are not grounded in virtue of God thinking them, but in virtue of exemplifying them (Adams 2000: 427; Chignell 2009: 185, 2012: 636). Call this thesis Exemplification.…”

“…For example: ‘The impenetrability of bodies, extension and such like, cannot be attributes of that which has understanding and will’ (OPA 2: 85). From the notion of real repugnance, Chignell introduces another condition of possibility which he calls ‘harmony’ – a thing is possible only if its predicates are harmonious (not in real opposition) with one another (Chignell 2009: 174, 2012: 647).…”

“…According to Chignell, the requirement for grounding harmony can be used to vindicate the crucial step of Kant’s argument that the ground of all possibility is unique, meaning that possibility cannot be grounded in a plurality of objects and therefore there is only one necessary being 15 . Moreover, he argues that Kant’s explicit arguments for uniqueness fail, and therefore the only way to save Kant’s argument is by appealing to the harmony requirement (Chignell 2012: 656–7). The uniqueness of God can be vindicated in the following manner: since the grounding of harmony requires co-exemplification in one being, the grounding of possibilities cannot be divided between several beings.…”