Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

Abstract

I argue against the prevalent view that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant accepts a further law of practical reason, ‘the’ Hypothetical Imperative. Kant rejects the idea that instrumental reason can be a source of a priori, objectively necessary normative requirements. His critique of instrumental reason is a central component of his argument for the supreme rational authority of morality: only moral reason can provide genuine, objective normative‐practical necessities. There are no objective practical necessities in our pursuit of empirical ends and desires. Hence, non‐moral agency is a rationally impoverished form of agency.

Kant's Ethics

“…But there is some debate in the literature about Kant's classification of hypothetical imperatives, in particular, whether there is just one hypothetical imperative or whether there are several. See in particularHill, 1973;Kohl, 2018;Papish, 2018;Schroeder, 2005;Timmermann, 2007;and Wood, 2013.…”

Kant’s Standpoint Distinction

“…This extension becomes less plausible if one thinks that (e.g.) rules of prudence have no a priori normative foundation (see Kohl forthcoming), though one can perhaps argue that such rules have a more than human basis insofar as they concern the wish for happiness that is constitutive of finitely rational agency.…”