Kant's Kingdom of Ends

Abstract

What is it to judge something to be a natural end? And what objects may properly be judged natural ends? These questions pose a challenge, because the predicates "natural" and "end" seemingly can not be instantiated at the same time-at least given some Kantian assumptions. My paper defends the thesis that Kant's "Critique of Teleological Judgment" (CTJ), nevertheless, provides a sensible account of judging something a natural end. On the account, a person judges an object O a natural end, if she thinks that the parts of O cause O and if she is committed to approach O in a top­down manner, as if the parts were produced in view of the whole. The account is non­realist, because it involves a commitment. With the account comes a characterization that provides necessary and sufficient conditions on objects that may properly be judged natural ends. My paper reconstructs the argument in CTJ, § §64­65 where the account and the characterization are derived.