Kant, Xunzi and the Artificiality of Manners

Abstract

Both Chinese and Western philosophers have argued for the ethical importance of manners. Their approaches are sometimes criticized on the grounds that manners are artificial. I compare Xunzi's and Kant's responses to this claim, and discuss the relevance of both positions for the development of a theory of manners. I show that there is no single artificiality claim, but rather four different claims: the claim that polite behavior lacks spontaneity, the claim that it is insincere, the claim that it goes against human nature, and the claim that it is arbitrary. While Kant is mainly concerned with the insincerity claim, Xunzi focusses on the claim that manners are arbitrary rules. Because of their different understandings of the function of manners both authors only provide a partial answer to the artificiality claim. To arrive at a full account of manners both perspectives must be combined. Keywords: Xunzi, Kant, manners, politeness, artificiality Kant, Xunzi in izumetničenost pravil vedênja IzvlečekTako kitajski kot zahodni filozofi so poudarjali etični pomen pravil vedênja, četudi so jih pogosto kritizirali zaradi njihove umetne narave. Avtorica primerja Xunzijevo in Kantovo stališče o tem problemu in ovrednoti pomen obeh pozicij za razvoj teorije vedênja. Pokaže, da stališče o izumetničenosti vedenjskih pravil ni samo eno, temveč gre za štiri različna stališča: pomanjkanje spontanosti, neiskrenost, nasprotje s človeško naravo ter arbitrarnost. Medtem ko se Kant v glavnem ukvarja s predpostavko neiskrenosti, se Xunzi bolj osredotoča na problematiko arbitrarnosti vedenjskih pravil. Zaradi različnega razumevanja funkcije pravil vedênja vsak od njiju izdela samo delne rešitve problema izumetničenosti. Če pa želimo izdelati celovitejšo teorijo vedênja, je treba kombinirati obe perspektivi.