Kants Paralogismen

Horstmann, Rolf‐Peter

doi:10.1515/kant.1993.84.4.408

Cited by 7 publications

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“…16. Regarding this understanding of I as an activity which characterizes especially the paralogisms of the B edition, see Horstmann (1993, 2010, 453).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘I do not cognize myself through being conscious of myself as thinking’: Self-knowledge and the irreducibility of self-objectification in Kant

Khurana

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

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The paper argues that Kant'sdistinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant'saccount interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the realm of theoretical cognition but can be put to work and made productive in terms of practical self-knowledge.

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“…16. Regarding this understanding of I as an activity which characterizes especially the paralogisms of the B edition, see Horstmann (1993, 2010, 453).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘I do not cognize myself through being conscious of myself as thinking’: Self-knowledge and the irreducibility of self-objectification in Kant

Khurana

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…22.For a discussion of Kant’s changing positions about the soul as a substance in the A and B editions of the Critique of Pure Reason , see Horstmann (1993). …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental powers and the soul in Kant’s Subjective Deduction and the Second Paralogism

Tester

2016

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Kant’s claim in the Subjective Deduction that we have multiple fundamental mental powers appears to be susceptible to some a priori metaphysical arguments made against multiple fundamental mental powers by Christian Wolff who held that these powers would violate the unity of thought and entail that the soul is an extended composite. I argue, however, that in the Second Paralogism and his lectures on metaphysics, Kant provides arguments that overcome these objections by showing that it is possible that a composite could ground the unity of thought, that properties are powers and therefore the soul could possess multiple powers, and the soul is a thing in itself so it cannot be an extended composite. These arguments lend additional support to the attribution of multiple mental powers to us in the Subjective Deduction.

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“…also A402 and B409), although the categories under the fourth heading of his table of categories (modality) hardly mesh seamlessly with the others. Horstmann, following Kant, extends the parallelism to existence as “modaler Sinn der Einheit” (Horstmann, 1993, p. 417, cf. 414).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…and (ii) What? questions are thus: (i) no historical figure or figures (so too Kitcher, but also Horstmann, 1993, p. 416) and (ii) no existing type of rational psychology, but rather a merely hypothetical discipline that mistakes (a) the highest intellectual condition of all empirical cognition überhaupt for (b) a cognition of an intelligible object. The critique of that mixed rational psychology (or Cartesian foundationalism) that mistakes (a) for a cognition of an empirical object is only a secondary theme of the Paralogisms.…”

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confidence: 99%

Kant's Radicalization of Cartesian Foundationalism: Thought Experiments, Transcendental Arguments, and Level Circularity in the Paralogisms

Miles

2022

Dialogue

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Kant's critique of rational psychology is a thought experiment that targets no individual or school, but rather the natural tendency of human reason to “hypostatize” the highest intellectual condition of all cognition (the pure ‘I think’) as though it were itself a cognition of the ‘I.’ To do so is to violate the very anti-circularity stricture also at work in Kant's better-known transcendental critiques of Locke and Hume. Along with a new type of circularity (level circularity), this article proposes a conception of transcendental arguments different from that of most contemporary debates regarding empiricism, naturalism, and Cartesian foundationalism.

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Kants Paralogismen

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

‘I do not cognize myself through being conscious of myself as thinking’: Self-knowledge and the irreducibility of self-objectification in Kant

‘I do not cognize myself through being conscious of myself as thinking’: Self-knowledge and the irreducibility of self-objectification in Kant

Mental powers and the soul in Kant’s Subjective Deduction and the Second Paralogism

Kant's Radicalization of Cartesian Foundationalism: Thought Experiments, Transcendental Arguments, and Level Circularity in the Paralogisms

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