Keep the Informants Talking: The Pursuit and Use of CBRN Weapons by Terrorist Organizations

Campbell, Blake I.; Murdie, Amanda

doi:10.1080/1057610x.2018.1531517

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Empirical scholarship follows two trajectories. The first focuses on country level determinants, looking at state level characteristics that facilitate the acquisition and use of CB weapons by groups (Ivanova & Sandler, 2006, 2007; Early, Fuhrman & Li 2013; Campbell & Murdie, 2018). The relatively more recent second stream shifts focus to organizational traits, with the social networks in which violent groups operate bridging these two tracks (Asal, Ackerman & Rethemeyer, 2012).…”

Section: Cbrn Weapon Usage By Non-state Actorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other scholars stress that corruption also raises the likelihood that organizations will pursue CBRN technology (Ivanova & Sandler, 2007; Early, Fuhrmann & Li, 2013) by making it easier for illicit actors to pay to get their hands on CBRN material. Campbell & Murdie (2018) argue that state repression can expose countries to the threat of CBRN acquisition by hindering intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism efforts, and that countries with better human rights records have a lower likelihood that CBRN material will make it into the hands of non-state actors (Campbell & Murdie, 2018).…”

Section: Cbrn Weapon Usage By Non-state Actorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, ideology presents a partial story insofar as many organizations of different ideological stripes have considered acquiring or using CBRN weapons (Asal, Ackerman & Rethemeyer, 2012). In a related vein, contrasting conceptual and empirical accounts exist on how religious ideology relates to the propensity of organizations to pursue unconventional weapons (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003; Blum, Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005; Campbell & Murdie, 2018).…”

Section: Cbrn Weapon Usage By Non-state Actorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additionally, the broader patterns displayed in the GTD miss plots to use CBRN weapons. For example, there are estimates of 40 cases of radiological materials pursuit by non-state actors (Campbell & Murdie, 2018; James Martin Center, 2016), more than 60 high-threat attacks or plots against nuclear facilities (Ackerman & Halverson, 2016), and several expressions of interest by terrorist groups in acquiring nuclear weapons. For the period of 1990 to 2017, the POICN Database records a total of 224 uses and 517 total cases of CBRN pursuit (Binder & Ackerman, 2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Breaking taboos: Why insurgents pursue and use CBRN weapons

Asal

Avdan

Ackerman

2022

Journal of Peace Research

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Much ado has been made about the specter of unconventional weapons in the hands of militant groups. Despite the alarmism of the policy community, the pursuit of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities by non-state actors is rare. What explains why some violent non-state organizations pursue chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons while most do not? Using new data on organizational behaviors and attributes from the Big Allied and Dangerous 2 Insurgency project, we analyze 140 insurgent actors, from 1998 to 2012. We expand previous work by Asal, Ackerman & Rethemeyer by studying the phenomenon longitudinally and attending to organizational behavior rather than only to structural and environmental factors. We find that organizations that attack cultural sites are more likely to pursue and use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. We interpret the latter as a willingness to transgress upon accepted mores, for the sake of sensationalism and shock value, which coheres with a willingness to pursue unconventional weapons. Our results reflect that chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear pursuit and use is part of a larger strategy for some violent non-state organizations, one predicated on generating mass fear and exacting a psychological toll.

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Section: Cbrn Weapon Usage By Non-state Actorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Cbrn Weapon Usage By Non-state Actorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Cbrn Weapon Usage By Non-state Actorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Breaking taboos: Why insurgents pursue and use CBRN weapons

Asal

Avdan

Ackerman

2022

Journal of Peace Research

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“…In particular, we argue that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s public, rhetorical support for the CW taboo belies his private opposition to the taboo demonstrated by his regime’s actions (Price 2019; Stimmer 2019). Although often described as the “poor man’s bomb” (Horowitz and Narang 2014), CW killed tens of thousands during World War I, and their increasing use by state and non-state actors from Russia and Syria to the Islamic State makes insincere norm-holding of the CW taboo—among elites and the mass public—especially policy relevant (Campbell and Murdie 2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Two Faces of Opposition to Chemical Weapons: Sincere Versus Insincere Norm-Holders

Blair

Chu

Schwartz

2021

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Prominent research holds that the use of weapons of mass destruction is taboo. But how strong are these norms? Investigating this question among the mass public, we argue that some citizens actually support taboo policies in private but are unwilling to express counter-normative opinions openly due to fear of social sanction. These insincere norm-holders are difficult to identify empirically because they are observationally equivalent to sincere norm-holders in direct-question surveys. To overcome this challenge, we use a list design, which allows survey respondents to indirectly express sensitive opinions. The results from three list experiments show that between 10% and 17% of Americans falsify their preferences over chemical weapons use when asked directly. In an extension, we explore our framework in the realm of nuclear weapons and elite behavior. Our findings advance a specific debate on the strength of weapons taboos, while our conceptualization of insincere norm-holders and methodological application have broader implications for how scholars might think about and measure norms in international politics.

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CBRN Terrorism

Wilson

2022

Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications

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Keep the Informants Talking: The Pursuit and Use of CBRN Weapons by Terrorist Organizations

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Breaking taboos: Why insurgents pursue and use CBRN weapons

Breaking taboos: Why insurgents pursue and use CBRN weapons

The Two Faces of Opposition to Chemical Weapons: Sincere Versus Insincere Norm-Holders

CBRN Terrorism

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