Keeping or reversing social norms promote cooperation by enhancing indirect reciprocity

Quan, Ji; Nie, Jiacheng; Chen, Wenman; Wang, Xianjia

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2022.111986

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…It is known that the leading eight social norms cannot maintain cooperation [51] in stochastic processes of invasion and fixation [54] against those who always cooperate (ALLC) and those who always defect (ALLD). On the other hand, cooperation is maintained if we additionally introduce somewhat special settings such as empathy, generosity, or spatial structure [55][56][57][58][59][60][61][62][63][64]. Although the recent study [53] has theoretically shown that one of the leading eight norms (called "L3" or "Simple Standing") can be evolutionarily stable whereas another one (called "L6" or "Stern Judging") is not, the remaining six of the leading eight norms have yet to be analytically studied.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some studies ( 45 – 47 ) have demonstrated the emergence of cooperation under noisy and private assessment, but under the restrictive assumption that only local mutations in the strategy space are allowed, thus excluding the possibility that a fully cooperative strategy is directly invaded by free riders. Other studies have shown that a mechanism to synchronize opinions between individuals has a positive influence on cooperation in indirect reciprocity, such as empathy, generosity, spatial structure, and so on ( 48 – 57 ).…”

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confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment

Fujimoto

Ohtsuki

2023

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others’ reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to stable cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the evolution of human cooperation.

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