Keeping power through opposition: party system change in Turkey

Arslantaş, Düzgün; Arslantaş, Şenol

doi:10.1017/npt.2020.1

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…ASPs are rarely discussed in the context of Turkey. 3 Institutional barriers such as the d’Hondt system with the highest national threshold in the world (10%) and the proactive stance of the military mostly accounted for the short-lived nature of the ASPs in Turkey (Altınordu, 2016; Arslantaş and Arslantaş, 2020). ASPs are not tolerated from a legal point of view either.…”

Section: Asps In Turkeymentioning

confidence: 99%

From “permanent opposition” to “power”: Anti-systemic parties in Turkey

Arslantaş

2023

Party Politics

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This study aims to explain why some anti-systemic parties come to power while others remain as permanent opposition or disappear over time. The evidence is sought from the comparative analysis of the socialist Workers’ Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, 1961-1971, permanent opposition) and the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, 1983-1998, in power). In particular, the parties are compared and contrasted in terms of their organizational style, leadership structure, and linkage with the voters. The paper argues that while the TIP built a loose and vertical local organization, the RP had a strong grassroots organization cemented through Islamic ideology. Second, while the RP had an unchallenged leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the TIP had a fragmented leadership resulting from multiple ideological conflicts which undermined the efficiency of the decision-making process and its implementation. Finally, while the TIP was a textbook example of a programmatic party under the guidance of socialist ideology, the RP heavily relied on the distribution of clientelist resources – mostly emanating from its control in the municipalities and central government – to address voters. Overall, the RP took advantage of these strategies to rapidly extend its voter base beyond core voters, particularly in metropolitan areas, while the TIP largely remained restricted to narrow constituencies.

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Section: Asps In Turkeymentioning

confidence: 99%

From “permanent opposition” to “power”: Anti-systemic parties in Turkey

Arslantaş

2023

Party Politics

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“…A related dimension is the transition of AKP during its successive election periods. Moving from a dominant to hegemonic party, AKP stands as a suitable example to investigate the clientelistic implementations and vote-buying patterns (Cinar, 2016;Arslantas et al, 2020;2020b). Referring to the resource theory (Greene, 2007), the predominant incumbent is eager to use public resources and politicizes the bureaucracy to reproduce electoral dominance (Magaloni, 2006;Szwarcberg, 2015).…”

Section: Prior Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Political climate and regional well-being in Turkey

Karahasan

Pinar

Deniz

2021

Territory, Politics, Governance

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Politicians can use social and economic policies on clientelist grounds neglecting the efficiency and equity concerns of public policy. While incumbents might reward and punish voters based on partyspecific fundamentals, the role of political ideologies and fragmentation is mostly neglected. For societies like Turkey, where the ideological stance is mixed and the level of fragmentation is varying, the regional political climate has implications for regional well-being beyond the borders of political parties. Our findings for the post-2000s validate that regions that are ideologically closer to the right and the incumbent party (Justice and Development Party-AKP-) attain higher well-being, while the opposite is true for ideologically polarized regions and regions closer to left-wing ideologies. Results are robust to the endogeneity of political climate and various model specifications.

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“…The Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP) in Turkey is now enjoying the longest period of one-party government in modern Turkey. The literature well established that the electoral system (D’Hondt) with the highest threshold in the world (10%—since 2019, 7%) the charismatic-populist leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the manipulation of ethnic and religious cleavages largely contributed to that success (See, e.g., Arslantaş & Arslantaş, 2020b; Arslantaş & Kaiser, 2022; Arslantaş et al, 2020). These elements, however, do not account for the ups and downs in the AKP's vote share.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Clientelism, partisanship, and ideology

Arslantaş

2023

International Area Studies Review

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This paper aims to highlight the role of clientelism in the Justice and Development Party's (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) electoral dominance in Turkish politics. Based on intensive fieldwork in Istanbul's one of the poorest and conservative districts of Bağcılar, it argues that the expansion of clientelist networks under the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi government has twofold ramifications, which in turn have reproduced the cycle of dominance. First, it strengthened clients’ partisan identification. Second, it changed clients’ ideology such that they became less resistant to or even supportive of neoliberal reforms that extensively undermined their well-being.

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Keeping power through opposition: party system change in Turkey

Cited by 11 publications

References 40 publications

From “permanent opposition” to “power”: Anti-systemic parties in Turkey

From “permanent opposition” to “power”: Anti-systemic parties in Turkey

Political climate and regional well-being in Turkey

Clientelism, partisanship, and ideology

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