Keiretsu Networks and Corporate Performance in Japan

Lincoln, James R.; Gerlach, Michael L.; Ahmadjian, Christina L.

doi:10.2307/2096407

Cited by 401 publications

(258 citation statements)

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“…Lincoln et al (1996) argue that in order to ascertain a significant effect on profitability, the length of the time period in which performance is measured should be long enough for a transfer to occur and its economic impact to become apparent. For example, if redistribution involves channeling funds for new investments in a firm, then it will require a considerable amount of time before the impact of it on the operating performance of that firm is discernible.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An indirect way to detect these transfers is to use the methodology employed by Lincoln, Gerlach and Ahmadjian (1996) and Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002). They argue that the outcome of the redistribution process is such that highly profitable firms will subsequently experience lower profitability while firms with low 12 profitability will subsequently benefit.…”

Section: Profit Redistribution In Business Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Business groups and profit redistribution: A boon or bane for firms?

George

Kabir

2008

Journal of Business Research

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Profit Redistribution In Business Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business groups and profit redistribution: A boon or bane for firms?

George

Kabir

2008

Journal of Business Research

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“…This complementarity in how the partner firms' earnings combine to condition the alliance odds-low-profit firms allying with high profit firms-calls to mind the iconic pharmaceutical industry tie-ups between cash-strapped biotech start-ups and deep-pocketed "big pharmas." It may also testify to the risk sharing prevalent in Japanese corporate networks: strong companies ally with weak ones in order to reverse their failing fortunes (Aoki, 1988;Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian, 1996).…”

Section: Financial-industrial Attributes In the Pooled Regressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business groups, networks, and embeddedness: innovation and implementation alliances in Japanese electronics, 1985–1998

Lincoln¹,

Guillot²,

Sargent³

2016

Ind Corp Change

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This paper examines the changing process of strategic alliance formation in the Japanese electronics industry between 1985 and 1998. With data on 123-135 Japanese electronics/electrical machinery makers, we use a dyad panel regression methodology to address a series of hypotheses drawn largely from embeddedness theory on how the firms' horizontal and vertical keiretsu business group affiliations and prior alliance networks supported and constrained partner choice in new R&D (innovation) and nonR&D (implementation) domestic economy alliances. We find that in the first half of our series (1985-91; the "preburst" period) keiretsu served as infrastructure or platform for new strategic alliances that had both innovation and implementation goals. In the second half of our series (1992-98, the "postbubble" period) the keiretsu effects on innovation alliance formation were gone, but the groups' role in nonR&D or implementation alliances, the purpose of which was often cost reduction, had expanded. Our results suggest that Japanese electronics firms over this interval of time adapted rationally to the heightened uncertainty and stringency of the Japanese domestic economic environment by searching outside their preexisting networks for innovation alliances while at the same time exploiting those networks for implementation alliances addressed to cost-reduction and other operational aims. The study speaks to embeddedness theory in showing that economic actors are not deterministically constrained by business group or other preexisting network ties but may in rational fashion exploit or abandon those ties with an eye to advancing corporate and alliance goals.3

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“…Personal relationships among key individuals play a crucial rote in defining the parameters of an implicit contract (Lincoln, Gerlach, & Ahmadjian, 1996;Bradach & Eccles, 1989). Beneath the formalities of contractual agreements, multiple interpersonal relationships emerge across organizational boundaries, both intra and inter, which facilitate the active exchange of information and a sense of trust that fosters both intra and inter-organizational cooperation (Walker, Kogut, &Shan, 1997;Gulati, 1995).…”

Section: Implicit Contract Maintenance and Subordinate Employee Permentioning

confidence: 99%