Keller Williams Realty (B)

Baron, James N.; Tayan, Brian

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1762873

Cited by 11 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These all became critical concerns in the legal system and for regulators. In addition, they became issues in the media and for academic and corporate researchers investigating the failure of governance mechanisms and looking to define corporate governance systems, frameworks and mechanisms (Larcker & Tayan, 2016). Since then, many codes, standards, and regulations have been formulated to define corporate governance mechanisms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance and firm performance in the Saudi banking industry

Almoneef

Samontaray

2019

Banks and Bank Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The current research aims to explore the impact of corporate governance on the Saudi banking performance for the period of 2014–2017. Though many researchers tested the relationship of corporate governance and firm performance, globally as well as in Saudi Arabia, however, during the literature review, it was found that many excluded the banking industry. This study tries to fill the gap by looking exclusively at the Saudi banking industry. Firm performance is measured through return on assets, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q as the dependent variables. The corporate governance practices are measured through the board characteristics (size, meeting, number of committees, independence, foreign board membership), and an audit committee (size, meeting, independence) as the independent variables. Firm size and firm age are the controls. Panel data analysis was implemented, using both descriptive and multivariate analysis through multiple regression to investigate the governance practices and firm performance. The empirical findings demonstrate that board size, audit committee meeting and bank size have a positive impact on ROE, whereas board independence has a negative impact on ROE. Similarly, board size and bank size have a positive relationship with ROA and board meeting has a negative relationship with ROA. Further, board (size and independence) and bank size have a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q, whereas number of board committees and bank age have a negative relationship with Tobin’s Q. Finally, audit committee (size and independence) and foreign board membership have no impact on the bank performance.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance and firm performance in the Saudi banking industry

Almoneef

Samontaray

2019

Banks and Bank Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Investors generally are in favour towards legal mechanism for (1) protection of their property from expropriation, (2) high probability of claiming contracts, (3) calling for a meeting with management if there is a significant concern, and (4) cleanliness of public governance to avoid extra undesirable costs (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). Additionally, in the condition of market and firm control system are poor, they still may benefit from government's intervention to overcome agency problem (Jensen, 2005), and to even improve economic condition (Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additionally, in the condition of market and firm control system are poor, they still may benefit from government's intervention to overcome agency problem (Jensen, 2005), and to even improve economic condition (Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012). However, Larcker and Tayan (2011) argue that public governance with so-called interventions does not work properly (i.e. in protecting property rights) if corruption is perceived high.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are four corporate governance variables studied in this study. Board of directors are liable in advisory and oversight (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). Advisory role is the place of management to consult of strategic and operational directions while oversight role which covers monitoring power over management being at shareholders' interest.…”

Section: H1 Earnings Quality Is Lower For Firms In Lower Agency Costmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Board Structure and Earnings Management: Evidence of South East Asia Countries Categorised by Agency Cost Level

Putra

Arif

2017

Hasanuddin Econ. Bus. Rev.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Agency theory infers that investors will incur cost to make alignment on principal-agent interest. A critic, however, has pointed out that the conflict of interest between principal and agent is not the only cause for agency cost. Cultural context (Johnson & Droege, 2004) and legal system (La Porta, et al., 2000) are also found as contributing factors. This study is to empirically investigate how board size, board independency, audit committee size and audit committee independency affect the earnings quality in the context of low or high level agency cost country according to Transparency International’s corruption level and Hofstede’s cultural values. 538 firm-year across 6 South East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) are observed in this research. Five Different accrual models (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, Detecting Earnings Management, 1995; Kasznik, 1999; Dechow, Richardson, & Tuna, Earnings management and costs to investors from firms meeting or slightly exceeding benchmarks, 2002; Dechow & Dichev, The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors, 2002) are used to generate abnormal accruals which will be used as proxy for earnings management while to generate suitable factors from corporate governance variables, principal component analysis (PCA) is employed. Results indicate that (1) earnings management is efficient; (2) size and independency of Board of Director and audit committee are effective in reducing earnings management behaviour; (3) the management of firms operating in higher agency cost context will take advantage from the structure of corporate governance (size and independency of Board of Directors and audit committee) to conduct earnings management. Additionally, it is also found that bigger size (higher leverage) firms perform less (more) accounting discretion compared to their counterparts.

show abstract

“…Prior to the pandemic, only 19% mentioned such a risk (Theile et al, 2020 )—suggesting that firms are incredibly reluctant to release information on obstacles. These disclosures are centered around the tourism and airline industries—where travel is vital (Larcker et al, 2020 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

COVID‐19 challenges and firm responses: Analysis of a city‐wide census in a developing country

Weber

Huynh

2022

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We use the unique data set of 16,300 firms' responses for the large‐scale census survey in an urban area at Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam) to study how firms perceived their problems and responded to during the COVID‐19 pandemic. We provide estimates of 65 cross‐associations between a firm's challenges during the pandemic and their responses. We find several firm characteristics that suggest increased likelihood of pandemic response, including some, such as state ownership, which are typically associated with being slow to respond to market conditions. A theoretical model is posited that matches with the rapidly declared survey response.

show abstract

Keller Williams Realty (B)

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Corporate governance and firm performance in the Saudi banking industry

Corporate governance and firm performance in the Saudi banking industry

Board Structure and Earnings Management: Evidence of South East Asia Countries Categorised by Agency Cost Level

COVID‐19 challenges and firm responses: Analysis of a city‐wide census in a developing country

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About