1999
DOI: 10.17487/rfc2627
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Key Management for Multicast: Issues and Architectures

Abstract: This report contains a discussion of the difficult problem of key management for multicast communication sessions. It focuses on two main areas of concern with respect to key management, which are, initializing the multicast group with a common net key and rekeying the multicast group. A rekey may be necessary upon the compromise of a user or for other reasons (e.g., periodic rekey). In particular, this report identifies a technique which allows for secure compromise recovery, while also being robust against c… Show more

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Cited by 801 publications
(707 citation statements)
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“…The ability to handle member revocation is modelled by allowing the adversary to corrupt members and obtain their secret keys. This formalization is general and captures the security notions of many multicast schemes such as those LKH schemes [3,4] which are based on symmetric key cryptography. However we note that in all the construction we introduce later, the secret keys of the revoked members constitute the actual encryption key.…”
Section: Notion Of Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ability to handle member revocation is modelled by allowing the adversary to corrupt members and obtain their secret keys. This formalization is general and captures the security notions of many multicast schemes such as those LKH schemes [3,4] which are based on symmetric key cryptography. However we note that in all the construction we introduce later, the secret keys of the revoked members constitute the actual encryption key.…”
Section: Notion Of Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…al. [27], which have each led to several derivative works. In the framework laid out above, both these works take a similar approach: They take a universe of an exponential (in n) number of decryption devices, and distribute them according to some scheme to the users.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As one might imagine, when given such a large number of decryption devices, it is quite simple to design distribution schemes which achieve the goals stated above. Indeed, [27] uses a simple balanced binary tree based scheme. By using such a large number of decryption keys, both [13] and [27] are in fact able to achieve stronger properties, for example the scheme of [27] can allow the number of excluded users k to be arbitrary, rather than fixed in advance.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…SIM-KM [6] is an efficient key management scheme to distribute and change keys as required [16] for secure group communication. While we provide a description of SIM-KM to show how asymmetric keys are used for multicast data protection the proposed authentication scheme may be used with any asymmetric multicast data protection scheme to provide multicast group authentication.…”
Section: Sim-kmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While we provide a description of SIM-KM to show how asymmetric keys are used for multicast data protection the proposed authentication scheme may be used with any asymmetric multicast data protection scheme to provide multicast group authentication. SIM-KM uses proxy encryptions [16] to split the multicast distribution tree into subgroups when needed. A re-key message combines the subgroups to form a single distribution tree.…”
Section: Sim-kmmentioning
confidence: 99%