Key questions for conservation tenders as a means for delivering biodiversity benefits on private land

Abstract

Summary In 2021, as part of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the world’s nations will meet to determine biodiversity targets for this decade, including area‐based protection targets. Conservation tenders (a form of market‐based instrument) have been used in several countries for the protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystem services​ within a defined area, mostly on private land. Conservation tenders are promoted as delivering cost‐effective and targeted investment/outcomes in the context of limited funding for conservation. Despite the significant investment in the approach, the resultant biodiversity conservation outcomes from these tenders have received relatively little research attention. Key questions on the efficacy of conservation tenders for achieving biodiversity conservation outcomes are discussed, to inform policy makers, programme managers and researchers. Questions include the following: (i) What are the conservation objectives that conservation tenders seek to address that other mechanisms cannot?, (ii) What have been the biodiversity outcomes realised as they relate to ecosystem/habitat representation or ecosystem services?, (iii) How do policy makers plan to realise biodiversity values beyond the term of the agreement given no publicly stated strategy on securing long‐term outcomes?, (iv) Is reporting of activities and results sufficient to judge changed biodiversity condition or delivery of expected outcomes at the end of the agreement, and are there efforts/plans/aims to follow up on outcomes post the agreement term?, (v) What proportion of successful tenderers have a protective conservation covenant in place prior to signing a tender or as a result of signing a tender agreement?, (vi) What do we know about the intentions and capacity of landholders beyond the term of the agreement and what has been the fate of agreements (and conservation outcomes) if they have changed hands during the course of the agreement?, (vii) Is the confidential nature of bidding in many conservation tenders missing the opportunity for collective or collaborative conservation efforts that can sustain learning and enthusiasm post‐tender?, and (viii) Is the information on ecological values (ecosystem type, quality, landscape context etc) presented or made available in a way to landholders that maximises likely bidding to ensure a large pool and thus programme efficiency?

“Splitting the bill” for conservation: Perceptions and uptake of financial incentives by landholders managing privately protected areas

“…These include divergent stakeholder perceptions on equitable cost‐sharing arrangements, lack of additionality, marketing to appropriate audiences, insufficient and/or uncertain long‐term financial resourcing, distrust of organizations operating PPA programs, and psychological phenomena such as “crowding out” or even “crowding in” of motivations (Comerford, 2014; Elmendorf, 2003; Knight et al, 2010; Kusmanoff et al, 2016; Putten et al, 2011; Rode et al, 2015; Selinske et al, 2017; Stern, 2006; Yasué et al, 2019). Given the complex, diverse and dynamic contexts in which financial incentives are usually trialed and adopted (Owley & Rissman, 2016; Rissman, 2011), and the costs and implications of implementing them, providing an evidence‐base upon which to design, implement, monitor, evaluate and improve financial incentives for PPA programs is essential for ongoing learning into how to manage these programs so they are as effective, cost‐efficient, and equitable as possible (Fitzsimons & Cooke, 2021). Conservation covenant programs in Australia provide relevant examples for improving the design and implementation of national‐ and regional‐scale PPA networks.…”

Other Effective Area-Based Conservation Measures (OECMs) in Australia: Key Considerations for Assessment and Implementation

“…Conservation tenders resulting in (mostly) short-to medium set-term agreements (e.g., 5-20 years) have been popular in Australia, with over AUD 178 million spent on 94 different tender schemes between 2001 and 2012 resulting in >2177 successful bids covering over >2.5 million ha [83]. While these typically target areas of biodiversity importance and financial resources are provided to land managers (typically on private land) to manage the biodiversity values, questions have been raised about the long-term strategy for properties under set term agreements when that agreement comes to an end, particularly as most tender programs are not ongoing [84]. Considering the typical short-to medium-term nature of the agreements and lack of strategy for maintaining biodiversity beyond the life of those agreements, conservation tenders would be unlikely to qualify as OECMs.…”

Conservation covenants for ecosystem restoration: adapting an old instrument to a new global conservation challenge?

“…Furthermore, the efficacy of covenants is impacted by the wider governance challenges of private land conservation, including limited financial incentives for landholders to undertake nature-positive measures: given the choice, most landholders will accept financial incentives for set-term agreements over in-perpetuity covenants if both agreement types are offered (Productivity Commission, 2001; Covenants' wider governance context for conserving/restoring biodiversity on private land. Fitzsimons and Cooke, 2021). Opposition by agriculturalists to environmental restrictions has already led to retreat, in the states of New South Wales and Queensland, from controls on landholders' clearance of native vegetation (Heagney and Kovac, 2021).…”