Keynesianische Standardmodelle

Cyber warfare and autonomous self-defence

“…The seeds for the attack were sown even around 2008, when the worm was first infected networks around the world, although causing no grate damage to most systems infected. 36 Initially it was assumed the attacks on the nuclear facility had not been successful, but in the autumn of 2010, reports spread quickly about Iran's uranium enriching capabilities becoming 32 [80][81][82][83][84][85][86][87][88][89][90][91]. The authors also opine that nation states, terrorist groups, hacktivists and cyber criminals to achieve their own goals could use future versions of the virus, and that Stuxnet has started a new arms race, creating serious implications for the security of critical infrastructure worldwide.…”

“…86 It should be added that Sklerov himself draws heavily on Michael Schmitt's seminal works on cyber attacks. 87 Broadly speaking, Sklerov sets out three categories / approaches, while contemplating any defensive strategy in response to a cyber attack. 88 First, is what he deems as an 'instrument-based approach'-this questions whether the damage caused (in this case by cyber operations) could only have been previously achieved by kinetic means.…”