Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People From Being Saved

Hanser, Matthew

doi:10.1017/s095382080000251x

Cited by 34 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Kopelman 2007 ) and that killing and letting die are morally equivalent (Rachels 1975 ; Tooley 1980 ; cf. Nesbitt 1995 ; Hanser 1999 ). Again, our argument is different.…”

Section: Practical Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Death, treatment decisions and the permanent vegetative state: evidence from families and experts

Holland

Kitzinger

2014

Med Health Care and Philos

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Some brain injured patients are left in a permanent vegetative state, i.e., they have irreversibly lost their capacity for consciousness but retained some autonomic physiological functions, such as breathing unaided. Having discussed the controversial nature of the permanent vegetative state as a diagnostic category, we turn to the question of the patients’ ontological status. Are the permanently vegetative alive, dead, or in some other state? We present empirical data from interviews with relatives of patients, and with experts, to support the view that the ontological state of permanently vegetative patients is unclear: such patients are neither straightforwardly alive nor simply dead. Having defended this view from counter-arguments we turn to the practical question as to how these patients ought to be treated. Some relatives and experts believe it is right for patients to be shifted from their currently unclear ontological state to that of being straightforwardly dead, but many are concerned or even horrified by the only legally sanctioned method guaranteed to achieve this, namely withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration. A way of addressing this distress would be to allow active euthanasia for these patients. This is highly controversial; but we argue that standard objections to allowing active euthanasia for this particular class of permanently vegetative patients are weakened by these patients’ distinctive ontological status.

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“…Kopelman 2007 ) and that killing and letting die are morally equivalent (Rachels 1975 ; Tooley 1980 ; cf. Nesbitt 1995 ; Hanser 1999 ). Again, our argument is different.…”

Section: Practical Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Death, treatment decisions and the permanent vegetative state: evidence from families and experts

Holland

Kitzinger

2014

Med Health Care and Philos

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“…We are left to conclude that there is no morally relevant difference between harmful enabling and harmful allowing per se, and hence that the more complex versions of the DDA that are based on the rejection of this conclusion are false. 22 Department of Philosophy University of California, San Diego NOTES 1 See Foot, 1967and Hanser, 1999. 2 See Boorse and Sorensen, 1988McMahan, 1993;Vihvelin and Tomkow, 2005;and Woollard, 2008. 3 See Rachels, 1975;Kagan, 1989;Bennett, 1995;Unger, 1996;and Howard-Snyder, 2002.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Moral Status of Enabling Harm

Rickless

2011

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…The latter seems worse, morally. For, as Hanser (1999) argues, doing harm (i.e., increasing total harm) is morally worse than preventing someone from being saved (i.e., preventing total harm from being reduced). To see why, compare three cases.…”

Section: The 'Proves Too Much' Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Procreation is Immoral on Environmental Grounds

Vance

2023

J Ethics

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Some argue that procreation is immoral due to its negative environmental impact. Since living an "eco-gluttonous" lifestyle of excessive resource consumption is wrong in virtue of the fact that it increases greenhouse gas emissions and environmental impact, then bringing another human being into existence must also be wrong, for exactly this same reason. I support this position. It has recently been the subject of criticism, however, primarily on the grounds that such a position (1) is guilty of "double-counting" environmental impacts, and (2) that it over-generalizes to condemn other clearly permissible behaviors, such as saving lives, or certain instances of adoption and immigration. Here, I will defend the environmental argument against procreation from these criticisms. I will do this, first, under the assumption that our individual consumption and emissions cause significant harm. I will then address the problem of causal impotence, and argue that, even if our individual contributions to environmental problems ultimately make no difference to the amount of harm that occurs, procreation is still immoral for many, if not most, of those living in the developed world.

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Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People From Being Saved

Cited by 34 publications

References 3 publications

Death, treatment decisions and the permanent vegetative state: evidence from families and experts

Death, treatment decisions and the permanent vegetative state: evidence from families and experts

The Moral Status of Enabling Harm

Procreation is Immoral on Environmental Grounds

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