Kim on Causation and Mental Causation

Raatikainen, Panu

doi:10.18267/j.e-logos.458

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Many others make mention of the problems they find in the notion of causal sufficiency and its role in the exclusion argument. Examples can be found in Crane and Arnadottir (2013), Hitchcock (2012), Koons and Bealer (2010), List and Menzies (2009), Menzies (2015), Pernu (2013Pernu ( , 2016, Raatikainen (2013Raatikainen ( , 2018, Woodward (2008) and Zhong (2019). Such objections to the reliance on causal sufficiency tend to be part of more integrated responses to exclusion arguments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal exclusion without causal sufficiency

Vaassen

2020

Synthese

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Some non-reductionists claim that so-called 'exclusion arguments' against their position rely on a notion of causal sufficiency that is particularly problematic. I argue that such concerns about the role of causal sufficiency in exclusion arguments are relatively superficial since exclusionists can address them by reformulating exclusion arguments in terms of physical sufficiency. The resulting exclusion arguments still face familiar problems, but these are not related to the choice between causal sufficiency and physical sufficiency. The upshot is that objections to the notion of causal sufficiency can be answered in a straightforward fashion and that such objections therefore do not pose a serious threat to exclusion arguments. Keywords Exclusion argument • Causal exclusion • Causal sufficiency • Non-reductionism • Causation • Philosophy of mind • Mental causation • Reductionism 2 Non-reductionists vs. causal sufficiency Non-reductionists about the mind share one commitment. Namely that mental phenomena are distinct from physical phenomena in the following sense: no mental phenomenon is identical to a physical phenomenon. 2 Causal exclusion arguments against such non-reductionism have many formulations. We can take the following formulation, loosely based on Bennett (2008), as a starting point: Mental Causation Mental phenomena systematically cause physical phenomena. Non-Reductionism Mental phenomena are distinct from physical phenomena. Causal Closure Every physical phenomenon has a sufficient physical cause at any given time t (if it has a cause at all at t). Physical Parts For any two phenomena A and B, if A is a physical phenomenon and B is a part of A, then B is a physical phenomenon as well. 3 Causal Exclusion For any three phenomena A, B and C: if A occurs at t and is a sufficient cause for B's occurrence at t + x, no phenomenon C occurring at t that is distinct from A and is distinct from all of A's parts is a cause of B, unless it is a case of genuine overdetermination. 4 Non-Overdetermination There is no systematic genuine overdetermination of physical effects with mental causes. Mental Causation and Non-Reductionism together entail that physical phenomena are systematically caused by phenomena that are distinct from physical phenomena.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal exclusion without causal sufficiency

Vaassen

2020

Synthese

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“…Утверждение, что каждый физический эффект причинно обусловлен уже существовавшими ранее физическими детерминантами, и поэтому ментальные свойства не вносят никакого причинного вклада, является сердцевиной аргумента исключения. Существует несколько вариантов формулировки этого аргумента, иногда также называемого аргументом каузальной сверхдетерминации [Patterson, 2005;Gibb, 2014;Raatikainen, 2018]. В любом случае аргумент приводит к выводу, что ментальная причина всегда исключается физической причиной.…”

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The Mental Causality Exclusion Argument and the Levels of Organization of Living Objects

Cherezova

2023

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The paper aims to demonstrate the possibility of consistently accepting the existence of effective mental causality in the fundamentally physical world. We suppose that the concept of causality in J. Kim’s exclusion argument against mental causation, which implies а generative conception of causal relations, can be revised taking into account the specificity of the multilevel organization of living objects. Rejection of the mechanistic model of causality as a linear process, allows you to maintain commitment to the principle of causal closure of the physical world and at the same time explain how top-down causality at the macro level is possible. For this, we use the model of a fractal tree of causal chains by J. Lowe, in which mental causality plays the role of an indirect cause of a fact. We carry out a meaningful distinction between the causality of facts and events by resorting to the multilevel model of J. Ellis, in which mental causality can be considered as a macro-level fact that has a selective effect on physical events of lower levels, taking into account a wide environmental context.

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Beyin, Bilinç ve Nedensel Güçler

Üner Kaya

2024

Felsefe Dünyası

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Searle, güçlü yapay zekanın imkanına karşı tasarladığı Çince Odası Argüma’nın birinci öncülünde ‘beynin bilince neden olduğunu’ iddia eder. Beynin bilinci nedensel olarak meydana getirebilmesi için bunu yapmaya yetecek asgari güce sahip olması gerekir. Bu öncüle dayanarak ulaştığı sonuç ise, yalnızca beyninkine eşit nedensel güce sahip sistemlerin bilinçli olabileceğidir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, herhangi yapay bir sistemin bilinçli olmasının gerekli koşulu, o sistemin bilinci oluşturabilmek için yeterli nedensel güce sahip olmasıdır. Searle böylece beyinlerden daha az nedensel güce sahip yapay sistemlerin ya da insan dışı varlıkların bilinçli olma olasılığını tamamen dışlamış olur. Searle bu iddiasını ayrıca panpisişizmin yanlışlığını göstermek için felsefi rakiplerine karşı da sıklıkla kullanır. Bu makalede amacım Searle’ün nedensel güçlerle ilgili iddiasının dayandığı temel olan ‘beyin bilince neden olur’ öncülünün doğru olup olmadığını sorgulamaktır. Bunun için öncelikle Searle’ün nedensellik anlayışını Hume’a yönelttiği eleştiriler üzerinden analiz edeceğim ve onun iddiasının hangi nedensellik teorisiyle test edilebileceğine dair bir öneride bulunacağım. Son olarak ise, ulaşılan sonuçların nedensel güçlerle ilgili iddiası açısından ne ifade ettiğiyle ilgili bir değerlendirme yapacağım.

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Kim on Causation and Mental Causation

Abstract: Jaegwon Kim's views on mental causation and the exclusion argument are evaluated systematically. Particular attention is paid to different theories of causation. It is argued that the exclusion argument and its premises do not cohere well with any systematic view of causation.

Cited by 3 publications

References 85 publications

Causal exclusion without causal sufficiency

Causal exclusion without causal sufficiency

The Mental Causality Exclusion Argument and the Levels of Organization of Living Objects

Beyin, Bilinç ve Nedensel Güçler

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