Kırım Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Stratejisi: Rus Ordusuna Karşı Tuna’yı Savunmak

Abstract

The Crimean War was initiated as a classical Ottoman-Russian encounter and gradually turned into a struggle between great powers. The first year of the war took place on two fronts as other Ottoman-Russian wars of the 19th century until it turned into a European war. Military activities on the Danubian Front in 1853-54 were mostly in line with the Ottoman war strategy, albeit some differences. The defense of the Ottoman army was shaped by the topography of the region. The Ottomans aimed to take the advantage of natural obstacles to the invading army, such as the Danube River and the Balkan Mountains. Although the main objective of the Ottoman troops was to defend their positions, they still showed some limited offensive performance. The Ottoman army, to some extent, managed to use the indecisiveness and slowness of the Russian troops to their advantage, and seemed superior in almost every fight against the Russians. It can be argued that the Ottoman army took more initiative than previous encounters with the advantage of the international conjuncture. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire did not give up a defensive strategy while avoiding a decisive battle and taking risks.This study discusses the Ottoman-Russian encounter on the Danubian front in 1854, evaluates the siege of Silistre together with the battles of Olteniçe, Çatana, and Yergöğü, and analyzes the Ottoman military strategy and performance.