1980
DOI: 10.3138/cjh.15.2.207
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Kitchener: A Reputation Refurbished?

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Cited by 18 publications
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“…As Professor Neilson has indicated, Kitchener's reluctance to commit his last regular formation, the 29 Division, to the Dardanelles expedition in the spring of 1915, owed much to his continued fear of invasion. 69 Mr Beesley has also raised the possibility that the fear of invasion may have been kept alive in the spring of 1915 by a spectacular intelligence blunder. The DNI, Captain Hall and Lieutenant Colonel R.J. Drake of MO5 concocted a deception plan to conceal the despatch of British forces to the Dardanelles by persuading the Germans that the British intended to land an invasion force on the coast of northern Germany.…”
Section: Sir John French's Secret Service On the Western Front 1914-15mentioning
confidence: 96%
“…As Professor Neilson has indicated, Kitchener's reluctance to commit his last regular formation, the 29 Division, to the Dardanelles expedition in the spring of 1915, owed much to his continued fear of invasion. 69 Mr Beesley has also raised the possibility that the fear of invasion may have been kept alive in the spring of 1915 by a spectacular intelligence blunder. The DNI, Captain Hall and Lieutenant Colonel R.J. Drake of MO5 concocted a deception plan to conceal the despatch of British forces to the Dardanelles by persuading the Germans that the British intended to land an invasion force on the coast of northern Germany.…”
Section: Sir John French's Secret Service On the Western Front 1914-15mentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Moreover, establishing the observation of the German coastline could dramatically reduce the threat of invasion, a danger that the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, considered sufficient to justify withholding troops in Britain for defensive purposes, despite the urgent need to reinforce the front in France. 158 Controlling the German North Sea coastline may also have enabled more serious consideration of plans to penetrate the Baltic in order to threaten the German iron-ore trade with Scandinavia, or to conduct operations against the vulnerable Baltic littoral. Such naval operations therefore presented Churchill with the attractive possibility of facilitating a major re-focusing of Britain's war effort.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%