The emergence of mental states from neural states by partitioning the neural phase space is analyzed in terms of symbolic dynamics. Well-defined mental states provide contexts inducing a criterion of structural stability for the neurodynamics that can be implemented by particular partitions. This leads to distinguished subshifts of finite type that are either cyclic or irreducible. Cyclic shifts correspond to asymptotically stable fixed points or limit tori whereas irreducible shifts are obtained from generating partitions of mixing hyperbolic systems. These stability criteria are applied to the discussion of neural correlates of consiousness, to the definition of macroscopic neural states, and to aspects of the symbol grounding problem. In particular, it is shown that compatible mental descriptions, topologically equivalent to the neurodynamical description, emerge if the partition of the neural phase space is generating. If this is not the case, mental descriptions are incompatible or complementary. Consequences of this result for an integration or unification of cognitive science or psychology, respectively, will be indicated.
Interlevel RelationsKnowledge of well-defined relations among different levels of descriptions of physical and other systems is inevitable if one wants to understand how (elements of) different descriptions depend on each other, give rise to each other, or even imply each other. The most ambitious program in this regard is physical reduction in the sense that higher-level descriptions of features of a system are determined by the description of features at the most fundamental level of physical theory, no matter how remote the higher level is from that most fundamental level. This program assumes that the description of all features which are not included at the fundamental level can be constructed or derived from this level without additional input.However, already physical examples pose serious difficulties for this program. It has recently been proposed that the concept of contextual emergence (Atmanspacher and Bishop, this issue; Bishop and Atmanspacher, preprint) addresses such situations more properly. Contextual emergence is characterized by the fact that lowerlevel descriptions provide necessary, but not sufficient conditions for higher-level descriptions. (Note that such a relation between descriptive levels does not necessarily entail the same relation between ontological levels.) The presence of necessary conditions indicates that lower-level descriptions provide a basis for higher-level descriptions, while the absence of sufficient conditions means that higher-level features are neither logical consequences of lower-level descriptions nor can they be rigorously derived from them alone. Hence, a full-blown reductive program is inapplicable in these cases. Sufficient conditions for a rigorous derivation of higher-level features can be introduced through specifying contexts reflecting the particular kinds of contingency in a given situation.A key ingredient of this proc...