Know-how and concept possession

Bengson, John; Moffett, Marc A.

doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9146-4

Cited by 93 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…This alone would not establish that intellectualism is false, for it could be the case that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that that is merely disanalogous, in this respect, to other kinds of knowledge-that. That is, for all that we have shown, it could be the case that in any Gettier-like scenario where someone knows how to 6 The arguments given here can clearly be extended to other existing intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how, including those offered by Bengson and Moffett (2007), and Brogaard (2008Brogaard ( , 2009). Bengson and Moffett are committed to the claim that one knows how to φ only if there is some way w such that one knows that w is a way to φ.…”

Section: Three Putative Counterexamplesmentioning

confidence: 67%

Knowing How without Knowing That

Cath

2012

Knowing HowEssays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action

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Section: Three Putative Counterexamplesmentioning

confidence: 67%

Knowing How without Knowing That

Cath

2012

Knowing HowEssays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action

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“…Thus, according to most anti-intellectualists, practical knowers differ from theoretical knowers by virtue of having an ability that theoretical knowers lack. 4 Intellectualist positions on knowing how have been defended by a number of philosophers, most recently by Stanley (forthcoming), Bengson and Moffett (2007), Snowdon (2004) and Stanley and Williamson (2001). 5 All of these philosophers agree that knowing how is a special kind of knowing that.…”

Section: Knowing How and Armchair Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some intellectualists claim that the identification of know how with ability is plainly false, since there are, uncontroversially, cases in which one has know how while lacking the corresponding ability (see, e.g., Bengson et al 2009;Bengson and Moffett 2007;Snowdon 2004;Stanley and Williamson 2001). I know how to shoot pool, for example, even though my arm is in a cast and I am therefore unable to shoot pool.…”

Section: Knowing How Knowing That and Abilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hypothetical imperatives, for example, are directive but they are not tied to motivation in the way that other linguistic expressions appear to be so tied. Bengson and Moffett's (2007) more recent intellectualist account of know builds on Stanley and Williamson's. For these authors, to know how to perform an action is to know some proposition about how the action can be performed; however, a subject knows how only if she also has ''reasonable conceptual mastery'' over the concepts contained in the proposition, a mastery that is not required to simply possess the concepts.…”

Section: Intellectualist Alternativesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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In support of anti-intellectualism

Kumar

2009

Philos Stud

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Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere ''armchair knowledge.'' Know how is a mental state characterized by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential of know how, but not propositional knowledge, that it makes possible performance errors and has the functional role of guiding action. The theory is attractive, in part, because it allows for propositional, non-propositional and perhaps even non-representational varieties of know how.Keywords Know how Á Propositional knowledge Á Intellectualism Á Direction of fit Á Functional role Á Performance errorsThe recent literature on knowing how is dominated by intellectualism. 1 Most intellectualists subscribe to what is, frankly, a rather unintuitive view: to know how to do something is to know that it can or ought to be performed in a certain way. Resistance to intellectualism can be motivated by appeal to the essential link that know how bears to action, a link that is best captured within an anti-intellectualist model.A theory of knowing how, whether intellectualist or anti-intellectualist, must respect the distinctions we ordinarily draw between those who know how to perform an action and those who merely have ''armchair knowledge'' about how the action is performed. Attending carefully to these distinctions reveals an important and, I believe, essential feature of know how. Knowing how, in contrast with mere ''armchair knowledge,'' has a world-to-mind ''direction of fit'' (similar to but importantly different from the world-to-mind direction of fit of motivational states). The central claim in the paper is that know how is exhaustively characterized by a certain direction of fit and attendant functional role. Knowing how and armchair knowledgeThe most famous discussion of knowing how is somewhat dated, occurring in chapter two of Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind. Recently, however, there has been a renewal of interest in the subject among philosophers. Even those who haven't read the relevant philosophical literature are sure to have some grasp of the concept, mediated by a familiarity with the distinction between knowing how and knowing that. This is the distinction that marks the difference between an artist's knowledge and an art critic's, an athlete's knowledge and an instructor's. The one involves a fittingness for practical engagement with the world, the other a theoretical appreciation of that engagement.One of the most important sources of evidence to which an adequate theory of know how must attend are the cases that provide us with our fundamental grasp of the concept. These cases evince a contrast between practical and theoretical knowers-between, on the one hand, individuals who genuinely know how to perform...

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“…We can see just such a possibility described in the example from Bengson and Moffett (2007) of Irina Slutskaya, an Olympic figure skater who, we are told, knows how to perform a quintuple salchow despite being unable to do so. What the case of Irina highlights, Bengson and Moffett tell us, is that "there is good reason to think that knowing how to do a quintuple salchow does not entail the ability to do one" (2007, p.34).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge how, ability, and the type-token distinction

Young

2015

Synthese

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This paper examines the relationship between knowing how to G and the ability to G, which is typically presented in one of the following ways: (a) knowing how to G entails the ability to G; (b) knowing how to G does not entail the ability to G. In an attempt to reconcile these two putatively opposing positions, I distinguish between type and token actions. It is my contention that S can know how to G in the absence of an ability to Gtoken, where this action is derived from an actiontype, but not in the absence of the ability to perform the action-type itself (Gtype). This refinement is an attempt to reconcile differences between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism (broadly construed) with regard to knowledge how and ability.

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Know-how and concept possession

Cited by 93 publications

References 35 publications

Knowing How without Knowing That

Knowing How without Knowing That

In support of anti-intellectualism

Knowledge how, ability, and the type-token distinction

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