Knowing from Testimony

Lackey, Jennifer

doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00035.x

Cited by 36 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 81 publications

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“…After a long period of neglect, testimony has recently emerged as a central concern in epistemology. The exact nature of testimony and the conditions under which it can serve as a source of knowledge have been subject to a great deal of debate, but it is widely agreed that any account of knowledge acquisition which neglected testimony would “be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways” 1 (Lackey 2006: 432). Unsurprisingly, given these developments, there has been a renewed interest in apparent exceptions to our normal reliance on testimony and, in particular, in challenges to the epistemic value of testimony in aesthetics.…”

Section: Testimony: Aesthetic and Mundanementioning

confidence: 99%

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Aesthetic Testimony

Robson

2012

Philosophy Compass

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It is frequently claimed that we can learn very little, if anything, about the aesthetic character of an artwork (or other object of aesthetic appraisal) on the basis of testimony. Such disparaging assessments of the epistemic value of aesthetic testimony contrast markedly with our acceptance of testimony as an important (perhaps even basic) source of knowledge in many other areas. There have, however, been a number of challenges to this orthodoxy of late; from those who seek to deny that such a contrast exists (optimists) as well as attempts by those who accept the distinction (pessimists) to provide an explanation and defence of the contrast. In , I outline a little of the nature and history of the debate over aesthetic testimony. , focuses on the opposing positions on aesthetic testimony, optimism and pessimism, and takes steps to clarify what exactly is at issue between them. In , I survey considerations which have been adduced in favour of pessimism ranging from brute appeal to intuition to complex argumentation before turning in , to look at motivations for optimism. Finally, in , I consider some alternative views which claim that, for a variety of reasons, it is a mistake to construe the debate over aesthetic testimony as concerned (or at least as primarily concerned) with the epistemic standing of aesthetic beliefs formed on the basis of testimony.

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Section: Testimony: Aesthetic and Mundanementioning

confidence: 99%

“…15 15 For detailed examinations of different models of testimony see Fricker (1987) and Lackey (2006). …”

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Aesthetic Testimony

Robson

2012

Philosophy Compass

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“… PRC‐T is very similar to Jennifer Lackey's (, ) Positive Reasons Thesis, discussed in her work on testimony. According to the necessity version of the thesis (PR‐N), ‘Appropriate positive reasons are necessary for testimonial justification/warrant’ (, 148).…”

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confidence: 78%

Beliefs and Testimony as Social Evidence: Epistemic Egoism, Epistemic Universalism, and Common Consent Arguments

Rollins

2015

Philosophy Compass

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Until recently, epistemology was largely caught in the grips of an epistemically unrealistic radical epistemological individualism on which the beliefs and testimony of others were of virtually no epistemic significance. Thankfully, epistemologists have bucked the individualist trend, acknowledging that one person's belief or testimony that P might offer another person prima facie epistemic reasons -or social evidence as I call it -to believe P. In this paper, I discuss the possibility and conditions under which beliefs and testimony act as social evidence, in particular, beliefs and testimony regarding the existence of God. The epistemic egoist maintains that one must possess positive reasons in favor of other people's reliability or trustworthiness before their beliefs and testimony offer prima facie social evidence. The epistemic universalist, on the other hand, argues that the beliefs of all others are prima facie credible and should be treated accordingly. All this will set up subsequent discussion of the epistemic significance of common consent or widespread belief in God. I show how common consent arguments assume the epistemic universalist's account of the conditions under which the beliefs and testimony of others acquire reason-giving force as social evidence.Philosophers often make the intuitive distinction between epistemic and practical reasons for believing propositions. Epistemic reasons for believing P are reasons that count in favor of (or indicate) the truth of P. They are considerations on the basis of which one believes a proposition insofar as one's goal is truth. 1 Evidence offers epistemic reasons to believe propositions. By 'evidence', I mean (roughly) signs or signals indicating the truth of propositions. 2 That Guilty's fingerprints were found on the murder weapon, for example, signals as evidence that Guilty committed the crime, and is thus an epistemic reason to believe that Guilty did it. Practical reasons for believing P, on the other hand, do not (necessarily) count in favor of P's truth. Rather, they are reasons why it would be good or (practically) beneficial to hold the belief. The possibility of expulsion from one's community or punishment for not believing that God exists -perhaps by God himself -would offer one practical reason to believe that God exists. 3 It's easy to imagine how other people believing P (e.g., that God exists) might give one practical reasons to believe P as well, for instance, if one's goal is simply to 'fit in' with the crowd. But do other people's beliefs, including their testimony, ever offer one reasons insofar as one's goal is truth? It seems so, yet disagreement abounds concerning the conditions under which other people's beliefs and testimony count as epistemic reasons.The goal of this paper is twofold: (i) to discuss two types of social epistemic reasons -what I call 'social evidence' -namely, the beliefs and testimony of others, and (ii) to discuss (consensus gentium) common consent arguments, which presuppose the existence and reason-giving forc...

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“…2) People who make assertions like P in conditions C are usually saying something true. Therefore, 3) P'' This traditional view is, thus, an example of a reductionist argument, since it states that testimony is reducible to more basic constitutive units of understanding, such as deduction and induction (e.g., Lackey 2006). A reductionist position assures that any reference to testimony as being constitutive of understanding is just a manner of referring to inductive and deductive processes.…”

Section: In Conclusion: Epistemology Of Testimony and Epistemic Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge, Belief, and Science Education

2016

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This article intends to show that the defense of ''understanding'' as one of the major goals of science education can be grounded on an anti-reductionist perspective on testimony as a source of knowledge. To do so, we critically revisit the discussion between Harvey Siegel and Alvin Goldman about the goals of science education, especially where it involves arguments based on the epistemology of testimony. Subsequently, we come back to a discussion between Charbel N. El-Hani and Eduardo Mortimer, on the one hand, and Michael Hoffmann, on the other, striving to strengthen the claim that rather than students' belief change, understanding should have epistemic priority as a goal of science education. Based on these two lines of discussion, we conclude that the reliance on testimony as a source of knowledge is necessary to the development of a more large and comprehensive scientific understanding by science students.

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Knowing from Testimony

Cited by 36 publications

References 81 publications

Aesthetic Testimony

Aesthetic Testimony

Beliefs and Testimony as Social Evidence: Epistemic Egoism, Epistemic Universalism, and Common Consent Arguments

Knowledge, Belief, and Science Education

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