Knowledge and Belief in Republic V

Fine, Gail

doi:10.1515/agph.1978.60.2.121

Cited by 123 publications

(22 citation statements)

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“…Anal., 72b15-20). 12 Gail Fine (1999) principle justifies all other beliefs. For the foundationalist, the regress problem halts at the point where one comprehends this first principle.…”

Section: The Regress Problemmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…I have benefited from our many discussions of the Republic. 2 Gail Fine (1999) 238-41. 3 We find a similar condition stated also at 402a, 531e, Thea.…”

Section: The Regress Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…" (2003; 4-5) 5 As to whether Plato is concerned with knowledge of objects or propositions, scholars are of two minds. Gail Fine (1999) takes it that, for Plato, knowledge is of propositions. Francisco Gonzales (1996) 245-275 argues for the alternative.…”

Section: The Regress Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I am inclined to allow for both; however, I am concerned primarily with propositions in this paper. 6 Gail Fine (1999) 238. See also (1979) 367.…”

Section: The Regress Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is Plato a Coherentist? The Theory of Knowledge in Republic V–VII

Nally

2015

Apeiron

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Although many scholars take a foundationalist approach to the theory of knowledge in Republic V-VII, few if any have responded to a growing number of coherentist interpretations, which hold that, for Plato, justification rests not on a first principle but rather on the coherence of a sufficiently large number of beliefs. This paper argues that the structure of knowledge in the Republic analogies is incompatible with the coherentist reading. Plato's analogies provide ample evidence that he holds something, at the very least, approximating a foundationalist first principle. In addition, this paper puts forward a Platonic solution to the regress problem. It argues that the form of the good is plausibly self-justifying. Because the form of the good serves as the "measure" by which the philosopher is able to determine the goodness, fittingness, and truth of all that he encounters (517b), it seems reasonable to conclude that the philosopher's ultimate source of justification -what it is that puts an end to the search for explanations and serves as an explanation of his claim to know the form of the good -is nothing other than the form of the good itself.

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“…Anal., 72b15-20). 12 Gail Fine (1999) principle justifies all other beliefs. For the foundationalist, the regress problem halts at the point where one comprehends this first principle.…”

Section: The Regress Problemmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…I have benefited from our many discussions of the Republic. 2 Gail Fine (1999) 238-41. 3 We find a similar condition stated also at 402a, 531e, Thea.…”

Section: The Regress Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Regress Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I am inclined to allow for both; however, I am concerned primarily with propositions in this paper. 6 Gail Fine (1999) 238. See also (1979) 367.…”

Section: The Regress Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Is Plato a Coherentist? The Theory of Knowledge in Republic V–VII

Nally

2015

Apeiron

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“…This interpretation is proposed by Fine 1979, and in an alternative version by Benson 1992. Fine argues that the imaginary proponent of the definition of knowledge as true judgement is the one who holds the acquaintance principle; indeed, she claims, the acquaintance principle implies the definition (77). But since the acquaintance principle also implies that there is no false judgement, which there clearly is, the definition and the acquaintance principle on which it rests ought to be rejected.…”

Section: Steinmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Puzzle of False Judgement in the Theaetetus

Stein

2016

Phronesis

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A puzzle about false judgement is raised in the Theaetetus (187d-200c), but not successfully answered there. On the proposed account, the confusion that explicitly vitiates Theaetetus' final attempt to define knowledge is already at work implicitly in this puzzle. Theaetetus shares popular assumptions about knowledge (epistēmē), but also accepts that there are cognitive constraints on judgement (doxa): the puzzle arises because he fails to distinguish the one cognitive condition from the other.

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2003

The Blackwell Guide to Ancient Philosophy

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Knowledge and Belief in Republic V

Cited by 123 publications

References 0 publications

Is Plato a Coherentist? The Theory of Knowledge in Republic V–VII

Is Plato a Coherentist? The Theory of Knowledge in Republic V–VII

The Puzzle of False Judgement in the Theaetetus

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