Knowledge and reasoning

Abstract

This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasoning. At the same time, it unifies reasoning epistemically: practical and theoretical reasoning will turn out to be governed by the same epistemic norm—knowledge—in virtue of serving the same epistemic function: generating knowledge of the conclusion.

Fake News!

“…Often this information is false, but authentically believed by the person distributing it; there is no intention to mislead, but rather to educate or assist; and yet, because of the source and means of transmission of the content, it can be especially well‐suited to misleading people 1 . This account also does not capture cases like the ones Harris (2023) or Simion (2023) have in mind, where the purpose of disinformation is a different kind of epistemic failure than producing false beliefs.…”

“…Instead, it could be intended to make it more difficult to form true beliefs or to affect an audience's behavior in other ways. Simion (2023), too, argues that it is not essential to disinformation that it be false or misleading, nor that it be intended to mislead. On her account, what makes disinformation distinctive is that it generates ignorance , which she argues is distinct from promoting false belief.…”

How to act on what you know

“… See Hawthorne (2004),Williamson (2005b),Stanley (2005),Hawthorne and Stanley (2008),Fantl and McGrath (2009),Smithies (2012),Mehta (2016),Williamson (2017) Simion (2021) andSchulz (2021b). Not all of these authors believe that knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for permissible reliance.3 Proposals differ on whether knowledge sets the standard for when one may treat a proposition as a premise in one's practical reasoning or as a reason for action.…”

Norms of Reasoning

“…Others hold that it is a belief about what you ought to do (e.g. Raz, 2011; Simion, 2021). I will not explore the implications of these views.…”