Knowledge and True Belief at<i>Theaetetus</i>201a–c

Nawar, Tamer

doi:10.1080/09608788.2013.822344

Cited by 7 publications

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“…road for oneself, Meno 97a9ff; seeing the crime for oneself, Theaetetus 201a7-c6). For discussion of such claims in the Theaetetus, see Nawar (2013). 21 The claim Gould argues against is that Platonic epistēmē is "an understanding of the moral truths of the universe, that is [...] an intellectual insight into the nature of right and wrong" (Gould, 1955: 4).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Platonic know‐how and successful action

Nawar

2017

European J of Philosophy

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In Plato's Euthydemus, Socrates claims that the possession of epistēmē (usually construed as knowledge or understanding) suffices for practical success. Several recent treatments suggest that we may make sense of this claim and render it plausible by drawing a distinction between so-called "outcome-success" and "internal-success" and supposing that epistēmē only guarantees internal-success. In this paper, I raise several objections to such treatments and suggest that the relevant cognitive state should be construed along less than purely intellectual lines: as a cognitive state constituted at least in part by ability. I argue that we may better explain Socrates' claims that epistēmē suffices for successful action by attending to the nature of abilities, what it is that we attempt to do when acting, and what successful action amounts to in the relevant contexts.These considerations suggest that, contrary to several recent treatments, the success in question is not always internal-success. | INTRODUCTIONWhat is the relation between knowledge and successful action? And what do we aim at in action and what makes for a successful action? This paper aims to make sense of the answers to these question put forward in Plato's Euthydemus where Socrates seems to claim that a certain sort of cognitive state is sufficient for some sort of practical success. My discussion is not, however, exclusively restricted to the Euthydemus, or indeed Plato (Aristotle and Ryle make prominent appearances). Neither is it exclusively historical as it is concerned at least in part with the nature of knowledge-how and abilities, the nature of practical success, and what precisely we attempt or aim at in action.Early on in the Euthydemus, Socrates offers an exhortation to a life of virtue and philosophy. Assuming that all people wish to do well (eu prattein, Euthydemus 278e3), Socrates wonders how we do well (279a1-2). In what follows, he considers the relation between good fortune, successful action, and various crafts (or kinds of know-how) and claims that flute players have good fortune (eutuchia) when it comes to success or doing well (eupragia) in flute music (279e1-2), and that something similar applies to knowing how to write (279e2-4) and various other kinds of knowledge. Socrates goes on to also claim that wisdom (sophia) does not require luck in order to succeed (280a6-b3) and that "knowledge (epistēmē) seems to provide men not only with good fortune (eutuchia) but also with success or doing well (eupragia) in every case of possession or action" (281b2-4).This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.

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“…travelling the road for oneself, Meno 97a9ff; seeing the crime for oneself, Theaetetus 201a7–c6). For discussion of such claims in the Theaetetus , see Nawar ().…”

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Platonic know‐how and successful action

Nawar

2017

European J of Philosophy

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Relative Change

Duncombe¹

2020

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A relative change occurs when some item changes a relation. This Element examines how Plato, Aristotle, Stoics and Sextus Empiricus approached relative change. Relative change is puzzling because the following three propositions each seem true but cannot be true together: (1) No relative changes are intrinsic changes; (2) Only intrinsic changes are proper changes; (3) Some relative changes are proper changes. Plato's Theaetetus and Phaedo property relative change. I argue that these dialogues assume relative changes to be intrinsic changes, so denying (1). Aristotle responds differently, by denying (3) that relative change is proper change. The Stoics claimed that some non-intrinsic changes are changes (denying (2)). Finally, I discuss Sextus' argument that relative change shows that there are no relatives at all.

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Proof, Knowledge, and Scepticism: Essays in Ancient Philosophy III By Jonathan Barnes Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 720, £85, HB ISBN: 9780199577538

Nawar¹

2015

Philosophy

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that behaviour, whether or not it is also 'causally determined'. An animal without the appropriate language cannot attribute beliefs or desires to others, nor even to herself, since she cannot be assessing the terms under which their (her) behaviour would be sensible (pace modern ethologists' suggestion that at least some non-human animals have 'a theory of mind', and so can recognize what other creatures do or do not know). Charlton comes close (188) to Richard Rorty's suggestion that even to attribute feelings to such an animal is only to express our determination to treat that animal in a certain way, for no very obvious reason: 'the moral prohibitions [against hurting babies 'and the better looking sorts of animals'] are expressions of a sense of community based on the imagined possibility of conversation, and the attribution of feelings is little more than a reminder of these prohibitions' (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press 1979), 190). This is probably not what Charlton himself intends. In conclusion, 'our world is one of change, time and causation, in which we act on purpose and for reasons' (209), and (too) 'much philosophy in modern times has been devoted to depriving our world of these features, and trying to reconcile us to this impoverishment' (209). Charlton by contrast insists that 'nothing is more important than that the world contains conscious beings, and that we ourselves are not just conscious but intelligent' (211). His own intelligence is clear, and even those who might be inclined to disagree with him in detail must find their own intelligence challengedand perhaps enhancedby his bracing attention to past philosophies, to grammar, and to the purported puzzles of metaphysics.

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Knowledge and True Belief atTheaetetus201a–c

Cited by 7 publications

References 15 publications

Platonic know‐how and successful action

Platonic know‐how and successful action

Relative Change

Proof, Knowledge, and Scepticism: Essays in Ancient Philosophy III By Jonathan Barnes Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 720, £85, HB ISBN: 9780199577538

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