Knowledge, despite Evidence to the Contrary

Borges, Rodrigo

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-04522-7_6

Synthese Library

2019

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-04522-7_6

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Knowledge, despite Evidence to the Contrary

Rodrigo Borges

Abstract: Plato claimed, in the Meno (97a-98c), that knowledge is more valuable than true belief in virtue of it being more stable than true belief. Knowledge, Plato argued, is a more reliable guide to action than true belief: the traveler who

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2024

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Unpossessed evidence revisited: our options are limited

Goldberg

2024

Philos Stud

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Several influential thought experiments from Harman 1973 purport to show that unpossessed evidence can undermine knowledge. Recently, some epistemologists have appealed to these thought experiments in defense of a logically stronger thesis: unpossessed evidence can defeat justification. But these appeals fail to appreciate that Harman himself thought of his examples as Gettier cases, and so would have rejected this strengthening of his thesis. On the contrary, he would have held that while unpossessed evidence can undermine knowledge, it leaves justification intact. In this paper I seek to undermine the viability of Harman’s position. If this is correct, contemporary epistemology faces a choice: either we reject that unpossessed evidence in Harman-style cases bears on knowledge at all, or else we must allow that it undermines knowledge by defeating justification. The former option must explain why Harman’s thought experiments elicit strong ‘no knowledge’ intuitions; the latter option embraces a minority view about the bearing of social expectations on the assessment of knowledge and justification (= the doctrine of normative defeat).

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Unpossessed evidence revisited: our options are limited

Goldberg

2024

Philos Stud

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Knowledge, despite Evidence to the Contrary

Abstract: Plato claimed, in the Meno (97a-98c), that knowledge is more valuable than true belief in virtue of it being more stable than true belief. Knowledge, Plato argued, is a more reliable guide to action than true belief: the traveler who

Cited by 1 publication

References 21 publications

Unpossessed evidence revisited: our options are limited

Unpossessed evidence revisited: our options are limited

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