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Purpose The elevator installation in old communities (EIOC) can effectively improve the public infrastructure of urban communities. However, differences in the decision-making behaviours of stakeholders lead to frequent conflicts, thereby hindering the implementation of EIOC. The purpose of this study is to explore the decision-making behavior of core stakeholders which are the government, community owners and elevator enterprises at different stages in the EIOC using the evolutionary game method. Design/methodology/approach A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, community owners and elevator enterprises was developed, and their evolutionary stabilisation strategies were explored in different stages. The dynamic change of the stakeholders' decision-making behaviours at different stages of the project and the influencing mechanism of the key factors on the decision-making behaviours of the three stakeholders were analysed through numerical simulation. Findings The results of this study showed that: Divergent interests led the government, community owners and elevator enterprises to adopt distinct decision-making behaviours at different stages, resulting in diverse attitudes and actions among stakeholders. A dynamic reward and penalty mechanism effectively motivated community owners and elevator enterprises to engage actively, fostering broad participation. However, the high regulatory cost diminished the government's regulatory effectiveness. This imbalance between penalties and incentives posed a challenge, impacting the overall effectiveness and efficiency of implementing the EIOC. Originality/value Existing research lacks exploration of the decision-making behaviours of stakeholders in community public infrastructure. This study developed a dynamic tripartite evolutionary game model in the EIOC from the gaming perspective. The results of this study provide a reference for dealing with the stakeholders' interests in the community public infrastructure and contribute to the theoretical basis for establishing an effective supervision mechanism.
Purpose The elevator installation in old communities (EIOC) can effectively improve the public infrastructure of urban communities. However, differences in the decision-making behaviours of stakeholders lead to frequent conflicts, thereby hindering the implementation of EIOC. The purpose of this study is to explore the decision-making behavior of core stakeholders which are the government, community owners and elevator enterprises at different stages in the EIOC using the evolutionary game method. Design/methodology/approach A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, community owners and elevator enterprises was developed, and their evolutionary stabilisation strategies were explored in different stages. The dynamic change of the stakeholders' decision-making behaviours at different stages of the project and the influencing mechanism of the key factors on the decision-making behaviours of the three stakeholders were analysed through numerical simulation. Findings The results of this study showed that: Divergent interests led the government, community owners and elevator enterprises to adopt distinct decision-making behaviours at different stages, resulting in diverse attitudes and actions among stakeholders. A dynamic reward and penalty mechanism effectively motivated community owners and elevator enterprises to engage actively, fostering broad participation. However, the high regulatory cost diminished the government's regulatory effectiveness. This imbalance between penalties and incentives posed a challenge, impacting the overall effectiveness and efficiency of implementing the EIOC. Originality/value Existing research lacks exploration of the decision-making behaviours of stakeholders in community public infrastructure. This study developed a dynamic tripartite evolutionary game model in the EIOC from the gaming perspective. The results of this study provide a reference for dealing with the stakeholders' interests in the community public infrastructure and contribute to the theoretical basis for establishing an effective supervision mechanism.
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