Knowledge from Falsehood

Warfield, Ted A.

doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00067.x

Cited by 132 publications

(85 citation statements)

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“…Such an observation prompted early theorists to add a "no false lemma" rule to the JTB analysis, stipulating that knowledge cannot arise from reasoning that essentially relies on a false belief (Clark, 1963). However, this suggestion is no longer seen as viable, both because there are cases in which the agent complies with that further condition but still seems not to know (Feldman, 1974;Saunders & Champawat, 1964), and because there are cases in which the agent violates the condition but does seem to know (Fitelson, 2010;Warfield, 2005).…”

Section: Gettier Cases and The Causal Conditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs

Juan²,

2013

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Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as "Gettier cases." Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers' intuitions about these cases, or whether lay intuitions vary depending on individual factors (e.g. ethnicity) or factors related to specific types of Gettier cases (e.g. cases that include apparent evidence). We report an experiment on lay attributions of knowledge and justification for a wide range of Gettier Cases and for a related class of controversial cases known as Skeptical Pressure cases, which are also thought by philosophers to elicit intuitive denials of knowledge. Although participants rated true beliefs in Gettier and Skeptical Pressure cases as being justified, they were significantly less likely to attribute knowledge for these cases than for matched true belief cases. This pattern of response was consistent across different variations of Gettier cases and did not vary by ethnicity or gender, although attributions of justification were found to be positively related to measures of empathy. These findings therefore suggest that across demographic groups, laypeople share similar epistemic concepts with philosophers, recognizing a difference between knowledge and justified true belief.

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Section: Gettier Cases and The Causal Conditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs

Juan²,

2013

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“…Because of his extreme confidence in his watch's accuracy, he reasons: 'It's exactly 2:58 pm; therefore I am not late for my 7 pm meeting'. Again he knows his conclusion, but as it happens it's exactly 2:56 pm, not 2:58 pm (Warfield 2005;Arnold 2013). …”

Section: Clayton Littlejohn King's College Londonmentioning

confidence: 91%

Learning from Learning from our Mistakes

Littlejohn¹

2016

Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals

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“…It might be argued that despite his false views about why the models are relevant, he really does know that they are relevant. In other words, we would have another counterexample, to be added to those discussed by Warfield (2005) and Luzzi (2010), to the theory that false beliefs cannot generate knowledge. 2.…”

Section: 2))mentioning

confidence: 99%

Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress

Weatherson¹

2016

Phil. Quart.

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Knowledge from Falsehood

Cited by 132 publications

References 0 publications

Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs

Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs

Learning from Learning from our Mistakes

Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress

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