Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes)

Abstract

It is widely held in philosophy that knowing is not a state of mind. On this view, rather than knowledge itself constituting a mental state, when we know, we occupy a belief state that exhibits some additional non-mental characteristics. Fascinatingly, however, new empirical findings from cognitive neuroscience and experimental philosophy now offer direct, converging evidence that the brain can—and often does—treat knowledge as if it is a mental state in its own right. While some might be tempted to keep the metaphysics of epistemic states separate from the neurocognitive mechanics of our judgements about them, here I will argue that these empirical findings give us sufficient reason to conclude that knowledge is at least sometimes a mental state. The basis of this argument is the epistemological principle of neurocognitive parity—roughly, if the contents of a given judgement reflect the structure of knowledge, so do the neurocognitive mechanics that produced them. This principle, which I defend here, straightforwardly supports the inference from the empirical observation that the brain sometimes treats knowledge like a mental state to the epistemological conclusion that knowledge is at least sometimes a mental state. All told, the composite, belief-centric metaphysics of knowledge widely assumed in epistemology is almost certainly mistaken.

Persistent burglars and knocks on doors: Causal indispensability of knowing vindicated

“…The first appeals to some recent empirical work on mental state attribution, that is, theory of mind, and one possible interpretation of this. It is a speculative suggestion, since it relies crucially on some recent empirical work that is yet to be further tested (I rely here on the literature overview and arguments from Phillips et al, 2021, Turri, 2017, and Nagel, 2017; see these for further references; see also Bricker 2020Bricker , 2021 for a different line of argument in favor of the thought that knowledge is a genuine mental and noncomposite state, an argument partly based on evidence from cognitive neuroscience). According to a common view in the theory of mind, the attribution of belief states (to other subjects) is more fundamental than the attribution of knowledge.…”

“…If so, and if ordinary language mental state ascriptions commonly express our mental state attributions (theory of mind), then we have here a fallible yet a plausible bridge principle connecting theory of mind to metaphysics of states (assuming that philosophical theories of mental states are in the business of specifying metaphysics of mental states). Second, one might endorse a principle recently defended by Adam Bricker (Bricker, 2021) that connects neurocognitive mechanisms involved in the production of (perceptual in particular) knowledge attributions to the content of judgments that attribute knowledge and thus to the metaphysics of the knowledge states. According to this very interesting proposal, called “Neurocognitive Parity,” “[t]he contents of judgement J about knowledge reflect the structure of knowledge only if the mechanics of the neural and cognitive processes responsible for J also reflect the structure of knowledge.” (Bricker, 2021, p. 11).…”

“…Second, one might endorse a principle recently defended by Adam Bricker (Bricker, 2021) that connects neurocognitive mechanisms involved in the production of (perceptual in particular) knowledge attributions to the content of judgments that attribute knowledge and thus to the metaphysics of the knowledge states. According to this very interesting proposal, called “Neurocognitive Parity,” “[t]he contents of judgement J about knowledge reflect the structure of knowledge only if the mechanics of the neural and cognitive processes responsible for J also reflect the structure of knowledge.” (Bricker, 2021, p. 11). In short, the idea here is that if our intuitive judgements about cases of knowledge (e.g., Gettier cases or what have you) are evidence for certain claims about metaphysics of knowledge (e.g., factivity, safety, but also being a simple non‐composed state), then the processes that produce knowledge attributions (e.g., self‐perspective inhibition, and others) are also evidence with respect to claims about metaphysics of knowledge.…”

“…In short, the idea here is that if our intuitive judgements about cases of knowledge (e.g., Gettier cases or what have you) are evidence for certain claims about metaphysics of knowledge (e.g., factivity, safety, but also being a simple non‐composed state), then the processes that produce knowledge attributions (e.g., self‐perspective inhibition, and others) are also evidence with respect to claims about metaphysics of knowledge. In short, according to Bricker: “[t]he point of neurocognitive parity is simply that when the content of judgements about knowledge can evidence the structure of knowledge, so too can the neurocognitive mechanics responsible for that content.” (Bricker, 2021, p. 12). Bricker also thinks that empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that processes that produce knowledge attribution are such that they treat knowledge as a mental state and also thinks that “[i]f the mechanics of some class of judgements (a) reflect the structure of knowledge and (b) treat knowledge as if it is a mental state, then knowledge is a mental state for the cases that are the subject of those judgements.” (Bricker, 2021, p. 13).…”

“…In short, according to Bricker: “[t]he point of neurocognitive parity is simply that when the content of judgements about knowledge can evidence the structure of knowledge, so too can the neurocognitive mechanics responsible for that content.” (Bricker, 2021, p. 12). Bricker also thinks that empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that processes that produce knowledge attribution are such that they treat knowledge as a mental state and also thinks that “[i]f the mechanics of some class of judgements (a) reflect the structure of knowledge and (b) treat knowledge as if it is a mental state, then knowledge is a mental state for the cases that are the subject of those judgements.” (Bricker, 2021, p. 13). Naturally, Bricker then concludes that knowledge is a genuine, non‐composite mental state.…”