2021
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03027-5
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Knowledge is closed under analytic content

Abstract: I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Note that also Elgin in[29] argues that knowledge is closed under (known) analytic entailment: a relation that holds just in case the meaning of one contains the meaning of the other 15. Hawke[30] and Holliday[15] explore the technical details of Yablo's proposal and in particular its problems.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note that also Elgin in[29] argues that knowledge is closed under (known) analytic entailment: a relation that holds just in case the meaning of one contains the meaning of the other 15. Hawke[30] and Holliday[15] explore the technical details of Yablo's proposal and in particular its problems.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…13 It may seem odd, given that I am ostensibly concerned with what makes it the case that an object is F, that I am sensitive to states that make it the case that something isn't F-that is, that this account is sensitive to falsifiers as well as to verifiers. 14 On some semantic approaches, the inclusion of falsifiers is gratuitous. If the meaning of 'Fa' is given by the possible worlds in which a is F, this collection also determines the worlds in which a is not F. I suspect this gratuity is responsible for the apparent oddity of mentioning falsifiers explicitly.…”
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confidence: 99%
“…That is, the semantics for atomic sentences is altered so that it applies to predicates and objects, rather than predicates and names. The valuation function may then be extended inductively so that it applies to formulas with free variables (not merely atomic predicates), and 'To be φ is to be ' is true 14 The first truth-maker approach sensitive to falsification occurs in [21].…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%