Knowledge is normal belief

Ball, Brian

doi:10.1093/analys/ans127

Cited by 13 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…To put it differently, one might be justified (in this sense) to believe, although the belief, in itself, is not justified (cf. Ball 2012;Feldman 2004). This example brings to light that there is a distinction to be made between 'a person is justified to believe' and 'a belief is justified'.…”

Section: Methodological Empiricismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Methodological empiricism and the choice of measurement models in social sciences

Peterson

2018

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Realism is generally assumed as the correct position with regards to psychological research and the measurement of psychological attributes in psychometrics. Borsboom et al. (2003), for instance, argued that the choice of a reflective measurement model necessarily implies a commitment to the existence of psychological constructs as well as a commitment to the belief that empirical testing of measurement models can justify their correspondence with real causal structures. Hood (2013) deemphasized Borsboom et al.'s position and argued that the choice of a reflective measurement model does not necessarily require ontological commitments, though, in his view, it does necessitate a commitment to minimal epistemic realism. Although these arguments are formulated with regard to psychological research, they can actually be generalized to other disciplines in social sciences that use similar methodologies and statistical techniques. In Hood's opinion, empiricism does not suffice to provide an adequate account of the choice of reflective measurement models given that this choice requires an appeal to causal explanations. In this paper, we argue against Hood and answer this challenge, providing epistemic foundations for social science research that do not appeal to realism.

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Section: Methodological Empiricismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Methodological empiricism and the choice of measurement models in social sciences

Peterson

2018

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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“…Several prominent philosophers defend JB = K, e.g., Brian Ball () Clayton Littlejohn (), Adrian Haddock (), Jonathan Sutton (; ) and, most notably, Tim Williamson (; ; ).…”

Section: Simple Knowledge Firstmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge‐first functionalism

Simion

2019

Philosophical Issues

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This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.If DT captures the way in which justification is normative, then, plausibly enough, the following captures the sense in which the epistemic justification of belief is normative:

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“…(Given the mild assumption that if it's rational to believe "If I don't know p then p" it's rational to believe "I know p" for the latter is equivalent to the material implication corresponding to the conditional, namely "I know p or p".) 18 See Jenkins (2006), Ball (2013), Greco (2014), Stalnaker (2015), Dutant (2016) and Goodman and Salow (2018) for accounts along those lines. Views of that kind are sometimes put forward to vindicate the KK principle (Greco, Stalnaker, Goodman and Salow).…”

Section: A Simple Fixmentioning

confidence: 99%