2015
DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12121
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Knowledge of campaign finance regulation reduces perceptions of corruption

Abstract: We use an experimental survey design to measure how campaign finance regulation influences perceptions of political corruption and trust in politicians when citizens are exposed to information about regulation. Unlike most observational studies, results of this experimental study suggest that knowledge of campaign finance regulation substantially reduces citizens’ perceptions of corruption but has only limited effect on trust in politicians. Findings have crucial implications for public policy. At a time when … Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(11 citation statements)
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References 53 publications
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“…Rather, they argue that the ‘information hypothesis’ (where information about corruption leads to action against it) better explains the dynamic between corruption and citizenry in Brazil. Avkiran et al (2016) reach a similar conclusion, showing how increased knowledge of campaign financing decreases perceptions of corruption.…”
Section: Background and Theoretical Expectationsmentioning
confidence: 53%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Rather, they argue that the ‘information hypothesis’ (where information about corruption leads to action against it) better explains the dynamic between corruption and citizenry in Brazil. Avkiran et al (2016) reach a similar conclusion, showing how increased knowledge of campaign financing decreases perceptions of corruption.…”
Section: Background and Theoretical Expectationsmentioning
confidence: 53%
“…In addition to the press freedom and expert evaluations of corruption interaction term and the main effects, we also include a series of control variables in our regression models that previous empirical studies suggest can influence citizens’ perceptions of government corruption in a country (Aßländer, 2018; Anduiza et al, 2013; Avkiran et al, 2016; Becker et al, 2016; Davis et al, 2004; della Porta, 2000; Miller et al, 2000; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). These control variables include gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from Penn World Tables, level of democracy from Polity, the degree of ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et al (2003) that involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics, and measures of religiosity and social connectedness from the Gallup World Poll.…”
Section: Data and Empirical Strategymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Pendanaan partai politik dari iuran keanggotaan, sumbangan, dan subsidi negara tidak berjalan efektif, hal ini disebabkan elit politik yang lebih menyukai penggalangan dana ilegal Akibatnya, korupsi politik terus berlanjut, oligarki telah menembus politik partai, dan anggaran negara disalahgunakan untuk tujuan politik. Ketiga, Avkiran, et.al (2015) mengkaji bagaimana pengetahuan tentang peraturan dana kampanye secara substansial mengurangi persepsi warga terhadap korupsi, khususnya pada kepercayaan pada politisi. Pengurangan dalam persepsi korupsi politik melalui penyebaran informasi tentang peraturan keuangan kampanye akan menjadi tambahan bagi legitimasi demokrasi.…”
Section: Pendahuluanunclassified
“…Secondly, reformers typically appeal to the importance of curbing special interests, leveling the playing field and fighting corruption (Williams 2000). Thirdly, public opinion surveys suggest ambivalence on the part of mass publics, who tend to support political finance regulations like spending limits but are skeptical when politicians legislate subsidies that support their own campaigns (Avkiran, Kanol, and Oliver 2016; Bryan and Baer 2005, 21; Primo and Milyo 2006).…”
Section: Comparative Political Financementioning
confidence: 99%