Knowledge partitioning in categorization: Boundary conditions

Abstract

Knowledge partitioning refers to the notion that knowledge can be held in independent and nonoverlapping parcels. Partitioned knowledge may cause people to make contradictory decisions for identical problems in different circumstances. We report two experiments that explored the boundary conditions of knowledge partitioning in categorization. The studies examined whether or not people would partition their knowledge (1) when categorization rules were or were not verbalizable and (2) when the to-be-categorized stimuli comprised perceptually separable or integral dimensions. When learning difficulty was controlled, partitioning occurred across all combinations of verbalizability and integrality/separability, underscoring the generality of knowledge partitioning. Partitioning was absent only when the task was rapidly learned and people reached a high level of proficiency, suggesting that task difficulty plays a critical role in the emergence of partitioned knowledge.

Seepage: Climate change denial and its effect on the scientific community

“…Turning to the specifics of the ''pause'', there is a relevant body of evidence in cognitive science which shows that people's knowledge is ''partitioned'' into modules that appear to be independent of each other and that are accessed on the basis of contextual cues (e.g., Kalish et al, 2004;Lewandowsky et al, 2002Lewandowsky et al, , 2006Sewell and Lewandowsky, 2011;Lewandowsky, 2003, 2004). Because access to knowledge is specific to the context in which it is queried, people may respond in one context by completely ignoring knowledge they demonstrably possess in a different context (Yang and Lewandowsky, 2004).…”

“Object Categorization: Reversals and Explanations of the Basic-Level Advantage” (Rogers & Patterson, 2007): A simplicity account

“…It is important to note here, though, that category intuitiveness is potentially influenced by other considerations as well, such as consistency with general knowledge (Heit, 1997;Murphy & Allopenna, 1994;Murphy & Medin, 1985;Wisniewski, 1995). In principle, the simplicity model could be modified to take general knowledge factors into account, but, as many authors have discovered, computationally incorporating effects of general knowledge is extremely hard, if not logically impossible (see, e.g., Fodor, 1983;Heit, 1997;Lewandowsky, Roberts, & Yang, 2006;Murphy, 2002;Pickering & Chater, 1995).…”

“…It is important to note here, though, that category intuitiveness is potentially influenced by other considerations as well, such as consistency with general knowledge (Heit, 1997;Murphy & Allopenna, 1994;Murphy & Medin, 1985;Wisniewski, 1995). In principle, the simplicity model could be modified to take general knowledge factors into account, but, as many authors have discovered, computationally incorporating effects of general knowledge is extremely hard, if not logically impossible (see, e.g., Fodor, 1983;Heit, 1997;Lewandowsky, Roberts, & Yang, 2006;Murphy, 2002;Pickering & Chater, 1995).Therefore, in all modelling work employing the simplicity model to-date, we have examined the scope of the model in its form based solely on similarity, and this approach is adopted in the present paper.A simplicity account of the basic level advantageWith respect to explaining the basic level advantage using the simplicity model, the situation is rather straightforward: we suggest that, given a hierarchy of classifications, the basic level will correspond to the classification that is 'most intuitive' (according to the model). Such a statement readily follows both by analogy from Rosch and Mervis's (1975) early formulation of basic level categorisation, and…”

One or two dimensions in spontaneous classification: A simplicity approach

“…However, it would be incorrect to perceive the present formalism as applicable in the case of knowledgerich stimuli in general. Several investigators have illustrated the complexity of interactions between general knowledge and spontaneous categorization (e.g., Heit, 1997;Lewandowsky, Roberts, & Yang, 2006;Malt & Sloman, 2007;Wisniewski, 1995), and our formalism would require considerable revision before it can accommodate general knowledge effects.…”