Knowledge transfer and its contexts

Abstract

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A pragmatic approach to scientific change: transfer, alignment, influence

“…In addition, some of the processes of change identified and modelled by the pragmatic approach seem to be common in science. For example, transfer is a common element of historical cases scientific change, as discussed by several historians and philosophers of science (Chang, 2021;Herfeld & Lisciandra, 2019). At the same time, processes such as alignment to be common in cases of interdisciplinary collaborations and the increasingly central role of material and technological compoin alignment seem to be common in cases of data-intensive science (Ankeny & Leonelli, 2016).…”

“…In the previous section, I have mentioned other and more recent developments in the philosophy of scientific change: many of these are indeed ways to expand philosophical approaches to change, and not just rebuttals of traditional perspectives (Soler et al, 2017). In particular, I argue that three main methodological features are shared across new discussions of scientific change and have significant consequences for the way we should approach change: the focus on contemporary cases of change; the attention to the small-scale at which change can happen; and the expansion of the units of change beyond theoretical and conceptual components (Ankeny & Leonelli, 2016;Gross et al, 2019;Herfeld & Lisciandra, 2019;Shan, 2019). Together with the more traditional work discussed in the previous section, these contributions constitute the main starting point of my work.…”

“…As such, transfer can take different forms depending on which components are transferred and which consequences transfer hasin this sense, transfer can be conceptual, methodological, technological, organisational. In many cases, transfer that elicits scientific change is knowledge transfer, which can include theories, models, evidence (Herfeld & Lisciandra, 2019). Yet transfer in the sciences is increasingly present at other levels.…”

Epistemic Transfer Between Linguistics and Neuroscience: Problems and Prospects

“…Applying a key distinction from current work in the philosophy of science (Herfeld & Lisciandra 2019), and elaborating on point (i), knowledge in the source domain can be of three kinds: (A) knowledge about some or all languages, or about human language as a cognitive capacity; (B) knowledge of linguistic formalisms, theories, or models, paired with knowledge that such constructs may be applied to some or all natural languages with some degree of success; (C) knowledge of how to use or apply a set of formal or empirical methods, techniques, or tools from various areas of linguistics (e.g., computational linguistics) to advance research or knowledge in the target domain (neuroscience). Type-A knowledge could provide candidates for realist interpretations of linguistic theories in the target field (e.g., that construct X is 'neurally real'); type-B knowledge stems from theories that may explain aspects of linguistic competence, but where a realist interpretation in the target domain is limited by the meta-theoretic nature of the knowledge involved; type-C knowledge only provides formal tools that may serve primarily data analysis and occasionally theory or model development in the target domain, but where issues of realism, as is normally understood in the philosophy of science, may not arise.…”

Knowledge transfer, templates, and the spillovers

“…Mathematical models and their modeling frameworks which were originally developed to advance knowledge in one scientific discipline are sometimes sourced to answer questions or solve problems in another discipline. Philosophers of science who study how knowledge transfers across disciplines have contemplated whether knowledge about how a mathematical model is previously applied in one discipline is necessary for the successful applications of that model in a different discipline (Humphreys 2019;Bradley and Thébault 2019;Herfeld and Lisciandra 2019). However, not much has been said about whether the answer to that epistemological question applies to the reapplication of a modeling framework.…”