Known Unknowns

Tanash, Rima S.; Chen, Zhouhan; Thakur, Tanmay; Wallach, Dan S.; Subramanian, Devika

doi:10.1145/2808138.2808147

Cited by 21 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Twitter is also under scrutiny for how its platform governance may conflict with users' interests and rights (Van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal 2018). Concerns have been raised about alleged biases in the algorithmic amplification (and deamplification) of content, with evidence from France, Germany, Turkey, and the United States, among other countries (Majó-Vázquez et al 2021;Tanash et al 2015;Jaidka, Mukerjee, and Lelkes 2023). Other scholars have also criticized Twitter's use as a censorship weapon by governments and political propagandists worldwide (Varol 2016;Elmas, Overdorf, and Aberer 2021;Jakesch et al 2021).…”

Section: Discussion and Potential Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Just Another Day on Twitter: A Complete 24 Hours of Twitter Data

Matter

Jaidka

Varol

et al. 2023

ICWSM

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At the end of October 2022, Elon Musk concluded his acquisition of Twitter. In the weeks and months before that, several questions were publicly discussed that were not only of interest to the platform's future buyers, but also of high relevance to the Computational Social Science research community. For example, how many active users does the platform have? What percentage of accounts on the site are bots? And, what are the dominating topics and sub-topical spheres on the platform? In a globally coordinated effort of 80 scholars to shed light on these questions, and to offer a dataset that will equip other researchers to do the same, we have collected all 375 million tweets published within a 24-hour time period starting on September 21, 2022. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first complete 24-hour Twitter dataset that is available for the research community. With it, the present work aims to accomplish two goals. First, we seek to answer the aforementioned questions and provide descriptive metrics about Twitter that can serve as references for other researchers. Second, we create a baseline dataset for future research that can be used to study the potential impact of the platform's ownership change.

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Section: Discussion and Potential Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Just Another Day on Twitter: A Complete 24 Hours of Twitter Data

Matter

Jaidka

Varol

et al. 2023

ICWSM

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“…In fact, Twitter's February 2015 transparency report demonstrated that the company complied with 50% of Turkey's content removal demands, a 30% increase from 2013 (Bila, ). Meanwhile, a 2014–2015 study (Tanash et al, ) demonstrated that the number of censored tweets in Turkey is over a quarter million, or two orders of magnitude larger than what is reported in Twitter's transparency reports. The vast majority of these censored tweets have political content (Tanash et al, ).…”

Section: Between Twitter and Turkey: State‐corporate Power And Anonymitymentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Meanwhile, a 2014–2015 study (Tanash et al, ) demonstrated that the number of censored tweets in Turkey is over a quarter million, or two orders of magnitude larger than what is reported in Twitter's transparency reports. The vast majority of these censored tweets have political content (Tanash et al, ). Thus, while Twitter is often perceived as an empowering platform among Turkish progressives and among many of our informants, Twitter's corporate practices have to a large extent complied with demands by the Turkish government, contributing to what Yesil () calls an ethos of “authoritarian neoliberalism.” As we have shown, Twitter can function as a “trap” as much as it can serve as a “transmitter,” a space of control as much as a space of freedom (Andrejevic, ; Chun, ).…”

Section: Between Twitter and Turkey: State‐corporate Power And Anonymitymentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Since the infrastructure and content of Facebook and Twitter are owned by U.S. multinational corporations that have supported Turkish state repression by removing tweets or shutting down accounts (Coskun & Kandemir, ; Tanash et al, ), the political benefits of social media have become less clear for oppositional and socially marginalized groups. While Coulson () is right to point out the political utility of social media, many of our informants made clear that they do not perceive them as spaces of “free expression” and use social media opportunistically.…”

Section: Sustained Social Media Use By Socially Marginalized Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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“I Have the Government in My Pocket…”: Social Media Users in Turkey, Transmit-Trap Dynamics, and Struggles Over Internet Freedom

Parks

Goodwin

Han

2017

Communication, Culture & Critique

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This article explores how social media users in Turkey conceptualize and navigate free speech challenges in the wake of recent government crackdowns on media institutions. The study is based on qualitative interviews with 40 social media users in Istanbul, including people from LGBTQ, feminist, Kurdish, journalist, activist, and academic communities, who have been on the front lines of free speech struggles in Turkey. Informants' comments converged around a theme of transmit‐trap dynamics, which emphasizes user experiences in the context of “networked authoritarianism,” and speaks to the ways Turkish social media users find themselves simultaneously empowered by and targeted within social media platforms.

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“…Relevant research from previous academic studies has shown that censorship exists in many countries such as China (Chen et al, 2013; Clayton et al, 2006; Dunna et al, 2018; Ensafi et al, 2015; Holowczak & Houmansadr, 2015; Hounsel et al, 2018; King et al, 2013, 2014; Knockel et al, 2015, 2017, 2018; Lowe et al, 2007; Marczak et al, 2015; Ng et al, 2018; Park & Crandall, 2010; Robinson et al, 2013; Winter & Lindskog, 2012; Wright, 2012; Xu et al, 2011), Thailand (Gebhart et al, 2017), Bangladesh (Morshed et al, 2017), Pakistan (Aceto et al, 2016; Nabi, 2013), India (Gosain et al, 2017; Yadav et al, 2018), Iran (Anderson, 2012, 2013; Aryan et al, 2013), Syria (Al‐Saqaf, 2016; Chaabane et al, 2014), Turkey (Tanash et al, 2015, 2017), Russia (Ramesh et al, 2020), and Mexico (Iszaevich, 2019). A few studies have looked at network interference and Internet blocking in the EU context (Busch et al, 2018; Savola, 2015; Schmidt‐Kessen et al, 2019; Ververis et al, 2015, 2017, 2021).…”

Section: Related Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Website blocking in the European Union: Network interference from the perspective of Open Internet

Ververis,

Lasota,

Ermakova

et al. 2023

Policy & Internet

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By establishing an infrastructure for monitoring and blocking networks in accordance with European Union (EU) law on preventive measures against the spread of information, EU member states have also made it easier to block websites and services and monitor information. While relevant studies have documented Internet censorship in non‐European countries, as well as the use of such infrastructures for political reasons, this study examines network interference practices such as website blocking against the backdrop of an almost complete lack of EU‐related research. Specifically, it performs and demonstrates an analysis for the total of 27 EU countries based on three different sources. They include first, tens of millions of historical network measurements collected in 2020 by Open Observatory of Network Interference volunteers from around the world; second, the publicly available blocking lists used by EU member states; and third, the reports issued by network regulators in each country from May 2020 to April 2021. Our results show that authorities issue multiple types of blocklists. Internet Service Providers limit access to different types and categories of websites and services. Such resources are sometimes blocked for unknown reasons and not included in any of the publicly available blocklists. The study concludes with the hurdles related to network measurements and the nontransparency from regulators regarding specifying website addresses in blocking activities.

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Known Unknowns

Cited by 21 publications

References 1 publication

Just Another Day on Twitter: A Complete 24 Hours of Twitter Data

Just Another Day on Twitter: A Complete 24 Hours of Twitter Data

“I Have the Government in My Pocket…”: Social Media Users in Turkey, Transmit-Trap Dynamics, and Struggles Over Internet Freedom

Website blocking in the European Union: Network interference from the perspective of Open Internet

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