Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War

Debs, Alexandre; Monteiro, Nuno P.

doi:10.1017/s0020818313000192

Cited by 149 publications

(86 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…• Period 1 6 Though the substantive contexts differ widely, Debs & Monteiro (2014) model the similar strategic interaction between two states where a target state makes decisions to invest in military capabilities that will shift the balance of power in its favor in the future, and its adversary decides whether to launch preventive war to preclude the power shift from occurring. My model differs from Debs and Monteiro in that I allow the power shifts to be not only endogenous (resulting from D's elimination efforts) but also exogenous.…”

Section: Theory Formal Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

Sudduth

2017

Comparative Political Studies

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Why do some leaders eliminate rivals from authoritarian regimes and therefore diminish elites' capabilities to remove them via coups, while others do not? By examining both dictators' incentives and opportunities to weaken regime elites, I show that dictators are more likely to eliminate rivals when elites' capabilities to oust dictators via coup is temporarily low. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, my theory predicts that dictators are more likely to weaken elites' capabilities as the threat of coup decreases rather than when coup risk is high. Furthermore, I argue that successful coups that put new dictators in power temporarily diminish elites' capabilities to remove dictators and, thus, provide a window of opportunity for the dictators to take steps to consolidate power. Empirical results using a new dataset on purges of militaries from 1969 to 2003 provide strong evidence for my hypotheses.

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Section: Theory Formal Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

Sudduth

2017

Comparative Political Studies

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“…Meirowitz and Sartori (2008);Powell (1993). 4 Baliga and Sjöström (2008); Benson and Wen (2011);Debs and Monteiro (2014). 5 More technically, previous models typically yield the behavior of empirical interest only in mixed-strategy equilibria, while our model produces the interesting behavior in purestrategy equilibria.…”

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confidence: 86%

“…war a mistake?). For example, if a potential attacker estimates for several years that proliferation is not near, but then receives hard intelligence that the proliferant's program has made progress and is nearing completion, the model implies that 24 Such as Benson and Wen (2011) and Debs and Monteiro (2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War

Bas¹,

Coe²

2016

Int Org

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We develop a formal model of bargaining between two states, where one can invest in a program to develop nuclear weapons and the other imperfectly observes its efforts and progress over time. In the absence of a nonproliferation deal, the observing state watches the former's program, waiting until proliferation seems imminent to attack. Chance elements-when the program will make progress and when the other state will discover this-determine outcomes. Surprise proliferation, crises over the suspected progress of a nuclear program, and possibly "mistaken" preventive wars arise endogenously from these chance elements. Consistent with the model's predictions and contrary to previous studies, the empirical evidence shows that the progress of a nuclear program and intelligence estimates of it explain the character and outcomes of most interactions between a proliferant and a potential preventive attacker. Counterintuitively, policies intended to reduce proliferation by delaying nuclear programs or improving monitoring capabilities may instead encourage it.

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“…The possibility of creating transparency determines positions on the offencedefence balance (Jervis, 1976), the tractability of the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978;Mearsheimer, 2001;Booth and Wheeler, 2007), or the avoidance of war (Fearon, 1995;Debs and Monteiro, 2014), among many other central issues in the field. Linked (but not antithetical) to the concept of uncertainty, transparency is often portrayed as a way in which the problems generated by anarchy can be surmounted without the need for global government.…”

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confidence: 99%

The concept of transparency in International Relations: Towards a critical approach

McCarthy

Fluck

2016

European Journal of International Relations

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Transparency is an important concept in International Relations. The possibility of realizing transparency in practice operates as a central analytical axis defining distinct positions on core theoretical problems within the field, from the security dilemma to the function of international institutions and beyond. As a political practice, the pursuit of transparent governance is a dominant feature of global politics, promoted by a wide range of actors across a vast range of issue areas, from nuclear proliferation, to internet governance, to the politics of foreign aid. Yet, despite its importance, precisely what transparency means or how the concept is understood is frequently ill-defined by academics and policymakers alike. As a result, the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of approaches to transparency in International Relations often sit in tension with their wider theoretical commitments. This article will examine the three primary understandings of transparency used in International Relations in order to unpack these commitments. It finds that while transparency is often explicitly conceptualized as a property of information, particularly within rationalist scholarship, this understanding rests upon an unarticulated set of sociological assumptions. This analysis suggests that conceptualizing 'transparency as information' without a wider sociology of knowledge production is highly problematic, potentially obscuring our ability to recognize transparent practices in global governance. Understanding transparency as dialogue, as a social practice rooted in shared cognitive capacities and epistemic

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Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War

Cited by 149 publications

References 42 publications

Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War

The concept of transparency in International Relations: Towards a critical approach

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