Kuhnian revolutions in neuroscience: the role of tool development

Parker, Dianne

doi:10.1007/s10539-018-9628-0

Cited by 13 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 109 publications

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“…John Eccles, who had been the most prominent critic of chemical transmission, used newly developed micropipettes and amplification equipment to examine his electrical hypothesis of transmission. Brock et al (1952) recorded inhibitory postsynaptic potentials (IPSPs) in cat spinal cord motor neurons, an observation that negated his electrical hypothesis (Karl Popper had encouraged him to formulate his electrical hypothesis in a form that could be negated), and as a result he accepted chemical transmission (Parker, 2018). From almost 50 years of debate on the nature of central nervous system (CNS) transmission, the chemical transmission paradigm rapidly developed, principally through the work of Bernard Katz (1966) on the statistical nature of transmission and the role of Ca 2+ .…”

Section: Historical Perspectives On Co-transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

General Principles of Neuronal Co-transmission: Insights From Multiple Model Systems

Svensson

Apergis-Schoute

Burnstock

et al. 2019

Front. Neural Circuits

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It is now accepted that neurons contain and release multiple transmitter substances. However, we still have only limited insight into the regulation and functional effects of this co-transmission. Given that there are 200 or more neurotransmitters, the chemical complexity of the nervous system is daunting. This is made more-so by the fact that their interacting effects can generate diverse non-linear and novel consequences. The relatively poor history of pharmacological approaches likely reflects the fact that manipulating a transmitter system will not necessarily mimic its roles within the normal chemical environment of the nervous system (e.g., when it acts in parallel with co-transmitters). In this article, co-transmission is discussed in a range of systems [from invertebrate and lower vertebrate models, up to the mammalian peripheral and central nervous system (CNS)] to highlight approaches used, degree of understanding, and open questions and future directions. Finally, we offer some outlines of what we consider to be the general principles of co-transmission, as well as what we think are the most pressing general aspects that need to be addressed to move forward in our understanding of co-transmission.

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Section: Historical Perspectives On Co-transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

General Principles of Neuronal Co-transmission: Insights From Multiple Model Systems

Svensson

Apergis-Schoute

Burnstock

et al. 2019

Front. Neural Circuits

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“…Linking lower and higher-level effects nevertheless remains the major open question in neuroscience. Claims to Kuhnian paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions ( Kuhn, 1962 ), which are generally rare events, are frequently made in neuroscience ( Parker, 2018 ). These claims could, in principle reflect genuine revolutionary advances; a reflection of the pre-paradigm state as neuroscience tries to find its optimal approach from among the various reductionist or representational approaches suggested; or evidence of a field in a scientific crisis as claimed or promised explanations and interventions have failed to materialize ( Parker, 2019 ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neurobiological reduction: From cellular explanations of behavior to interventions

Parker

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Scientific reductionism, the view that higher level functions can be explained by properties at some lower-level or levels, has been an assumption of nervous system analyses since the acceptance of the neuron doctrine in the late 19th century, and became a dominant experimental approach with the development of intracellular recording techniques in the mid-20th century. Subsequent refinements of electrophysiological approaches and the continual development of molecular and genetic techniques have promoted a focus on molecular and cellular mechanisms in experimental analyses and explanations of sensory, motor, and cognitive functions. Reductionist assumptions have also influenced our views of the etiology and treatment of psychopathologies, and have more recently led to claims that we can, or even should, pharmacologically enhance the normal brain. Reductionism remains an area of active debate in the philosophy of science. In neuroscience and psychology, the debate typically focuses on the mind-brain question and the mechanisms of cognition, and how or if they can be explained in neurobiological terms. However, these debates are affected by the complexity of the phenomena being considered and the difficulty of obtaining the necessary neurobiological detail. We can instead ask whether features identified in neurobiological analyses of simpler aspects in simpler nervous systems support current molecular and cellular approaches to explaining systems or behaviors. While my view is that they do not, this does not invite the opposing view prevalent in dichotomous thinking that molecular and cellular detail is irrelevant and we should focus on computations or representations. We instead need to consider how to address the long-standing dilemma of how a nervous system that ostensibly functions through discrete cell to cell communication can generate population effects across multiple spatial and temporal scales to generate behavior.

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“…En esta sección, argumento que reconocer el potencial revolucionario de una innovación técnica no es incompatible con la admisión del potencial revolucionario del cambio conceptual. En particular, rechazo el escepticismo de David Parker (2018), quien en su afán de reivindicar el concepto kuhniano de revolución cientí ca en neurociencia desestima el papel potencialmente revolucionario del desarrollo de herramientas.…”

Section: Escepticismo Respecto De Las Revoluciones Guiadas Por La Téc...unclassified

“…En la sección 3, argumento que reconocer el potencial revolucionario de una innovación técnica no es incompatible con la admisión del potencial revolucionario del cambio conceptual. En particular, rechazo el escepticismo de David Parker (2018), quien en su afán de reivindicar a Kuhn desestima el papel potencialmente revolucionario del desarrollo de herramientas. En la sección 4, muestro cómo la innovación conceptual y el desarrollo de herramientas se amalgaman en el caso del descubrimiento de la neurona.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Cambio conceptual e innovación técnica: los desafíos de las neurociencias a la filosofía de las revoluciones científicas

Barberis

2022

RHV

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El papel determinante que desempeña la innovación técnica en el progreso neurocientífico plantea desafíos especiales a la filosofía del cambio científico de raigambre kuhniana. Algunos filósofos de la neurociencia sostienen que las revoluciones en neurociencia no involucran cambios de paradigma, sino que dependen exclusivamente de la innovación técnica o experimental. Mediante el estudio del episodio histórico del descubrimiento de la neurona (1873-1909), argumento que las revoluciones en neurociencia, como muchas otras revoluciones de laboratorio, están frecuentemente impulsadas por el entrelazamiento de innovaciones técnicas y cambio conceptual.

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Kuhnian revolutions in neuroscience: the role of tool development

Cited by 13 publications

References 109 publications

General Principles of Neuronal Co-transmission: Insights From Multiple Model Systems

General Principles of Neuronal Co-transmission: Insights From Multiple Model Systems

Neurobiological reduction: From cellular explanations of behavior to interventions

Cambio conceptual e innovación técnica: los desafíos de las neurociencias a la filosofía de las revoluciones científicas

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