In today's terrorism-prone and security-focused world, evacuation emergencies, drills, and false alarms are becoming more and more common. Compliance to an evacuation order made by an authority in case of emergency can play a key role in the outcome of an emergency. In case an evacuee experiences repeated emergency scenarios which may be a false alarm (e.g., an evacuation drill, a false bomb threat, etc.) or an actual threat, the Aesop's cry wolf effect (repeated false alarms decrease order compliance) can severely affect his/her likelihood to evacuate. To analyse this key unsolved issue of evacuation research, a game-theoretic approach is proposed. Game theory is used to explore mutual best responses of an evacuee and an authority. In the proposed model the authority obtains a signal of whether there is a threat or not and decides whether to order an evacuation or not. The evacuee, after receiving an evacuation order, subsequently decides whether to stay or leave based on posterior beliefs that have been updated in response to the authority's action. Best-responses are derived and Sequential equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium are used as solution concepts (refining equilibria with the intuitive criterion). Model results highlight the benefits of announced evacuation drills and suggest that improving the accuracy of threat detection can prevent large inefficiencies associated with the cry wolf effect. dynamics during evacuation [2][3][4], which aims at representing human movement and associated behaviour in case of different scenarios and threats [6,7], or models of authority's recommendations [8].Human behaviour in evacuation scenarios has also been investigated using Virtual Reality tools, as they allow the investigation of individual and group decision making during evacuation [9][10][11][12]. Experimental work has been performed in order to validate such models and tools, including the study of different types of emergent behaviours related to evacuation dynamics [13][14][15][16][17].The main limitations of these tools is that they consider evacuation scenarios in isolation and they address only one of the two parties involved in an evacuation, either (i) the decision making of the authority (i.e. their orders/instructions) or (ii) the actions of the evacuees. In contrast, currently there is no framework available which is able to comprehensively consider optimal decision making strategies for an authority and an evacuee at the same time in case of several repeated emergency evacuation threats. Many tragedies have demonstrated the dilemmas that decision makers may face when dealing with emergency situations. For instance, in relation to the Costa Concordia disaster, the Italian court trial is evaluating the behaviour of captain Schettino who allegedly did not order the evacuation of the ship on time [18]. Apart from the Captain's negligence or a simply incorrect assessment of the situation, the analysis of the trade-offs between the cost of a useless evacuation (i.e., the risk of "ruining" the holid...