Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) play a major role in pushing states towards more ambitious environmental policies. However, demonstrating that this presumption is in fact true is rather difficult, because the same system structures of democracies that may create more opportunities for ENGO activities are also, on their own, conducive to better environmental policies. This leaves open the possibility that the additional (marginal) impact of ENGOs on policy-making is smaller than presumed. In trying to disentangle these effects, this paper examines the influence of ENGOs contingent on key structural characteristics of democratic systems. We develop the argument that presidential systems with a plurality electoral rule per se tend to provide more environmental public goods, which induces a smaller marginal impact of ENGOs. Conversely, parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral rule are likely to provide fewer environmental public goods, which allows for a larger marginal impact of ENGOs. We find robust empirical support for these hypotheses in analyses that focus on the ratification behavior of 75 democracies vis-à-vis 250 international environmental agreements in 1973-2002. Keywords: democracy; environmental non-governmental organizations; international environmental politics; parliamentary systems; presidential systems; plurality voting; proportional representation
Authors' noteThe research for this paper was carried out as part of the Swiss NCCR research program 'Challenges to Democracy in the 21 st Century' (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch). We thank four anonymous reviewers and the journal's editors, Donatella Della Porta and B. Guy Peters, for helpful comments. Supplemental information, the data set, and the replication files referred to in the text can be obtained from the authors on request.Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364002 2
IntroductionEnvironmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) have become highly visible in decision-making from local to global levels since the 1970s. An increasing body of research examines how ENGOs participate in policy-making, either indirectly (e.g. via lobbying or campaigns) or directly (e.g. by helping governments to design and implement environmental regulations) (e.g. Betsill and Corell, 2001;Corell and Betsill, 2001; see also Chayes and Chayes, 1993: 204;Raustiala, 1997;Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998;Roberts et al., 2004;von Stein, 2008;Böhmelt and Betzold, 2013).The general expectation in this literature and also in policy circles is that ENGOs play a major role in pushing governments towards more ambitious environmental policies at all political levels 1 . For example, ENGOs can enhance procedural legitimacy by promoting greater transparency and better representation of otherwise marginalized societal interests in policyformulation and implementation (see Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu, 2002; Steffek and Ferreti, 2009). Moreover, transboundary environmental proble...