L’actionnariat salarié favorise-t-il la diffusion d’information aux salariés et leur participation aux décisions stratégiques ? Une question de gouvernance d’entreprise

Guery, Loris; Stévenot, Anne

doi:10.7202/1053578ar

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Literature summary 1 Company size measured by staff number Kruse (1996), Pendleton (1997Pendleton ( , 2006, Festing et al (1999), Jones (2004), Meng et al (2011), Kim et al (2014), Fang et al (2015), Guery and Pendleton (2016), Jaakson and Kallaste (2016), Torp (2014), Guery and Guery (2017), Poutsma and Ligthart (2017), Mygind and Faigen (2017) Sector Kruse (1996), Pendleton (1997Pendleton ( , 2006, Kim et al (2014), Torp (2014), Jaakson and Kallaste (2016), Guery and Pendleton (2016), Guery and Guery (2017) Kruse (1996), Pendleton (1997Pendleton ( , 2006, Kim et al (2014), Guery and Pendleton (2016), Pendleton and Robinson (2016), Guery and Guery (2017), Poutsma and Ligthart (2017) 24 Performance (measured by productivity) Pendleton (1997)…”

Section: Id Description Of Firm Characteristics Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Distinct from profit-sharing schemes, ESOPs are share-based financial participation schemes, focusing on long-term rewards in share value and a less direct link to profitability (Pendleton, 1997). Most of them are managed by trusts for employees’ pension funds or saving; while, some specific ESOPs are bundled with the participation mechanism that grants employee investors specific claims and privileges that previously only belonged to firm owners, including the access to profits or information and participation in decision-making processes (Guery, 2015; Guery and Guery, 2017), etc. For this reason, the traditional boundary between workers and owners is blurring through the implementation of ESOPs (Rousseau and Shperling, 2003).…”

Section: Literature Review and Research Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Employee ownership in China: new evidence

Pan

2024

JPEO

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PurposeWith specific big-data mining worked on 61,522 firm announcements, we discovered a diverse Employee Share Ownership Plan (ESOP) model in China, called “Core-Staff-Based ESOPs.” Distinct from standard broad-based or executive-based ESOPs, these specific targeted-broad-based ESOPs require the qualification for participants, involving the participation of senior executives, directors at the middle level and any other employees that make particular contributions to firms. We take on the challenge to analyze ESOP mechanism, firm characteristics and performance in the view of organizational ecology and resource-based choice-making, and explore which factors have influenced the ESOP development in China.Design/methodology/approachWe utilize a combination of approaches including qualitative and quantitative methods, and construct the main database of 117,767 firm-quarter data.FindingsFirstly, based upon our institutional research, we find no coercive mechanisms that force all the Chinese listed firms to implement ESOPs since 2005. Secondly, our binary logistic regressions identify ESOP firms’ specific properties significantly distinct from non-ESOP firms, and draw profiles for these ESOP firms. Thirdly, our panel regression test results sustain the rational of ESOP mechanism, demonstrating that ESOPs enable Chinese firms to improve performance both in profits and their industry positions. Finally, with further quantitative tests, we find out this ESOP design’s limitations and the heterogenous effects due to China’s environments.Originality/valueThe discovery of Core-staff-based ESOPs contributes a diversity to the standard framework of ESOPs, enhances our understanding of China’s ESOP development, and provides new evidence for ESOP performance.

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Section: Id Description Of Firm Characteristics Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Review and Research Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Employee ownership in China: new evidence

Pan

2024

JPEO

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“…We chose to focus on France because it is the European country with the largest proportion of employee-owned shares, the highest number of employee owners, and the highest level of employee-owner representation on boards of directors. We used listed firms because the effect of ESO on employee participation in company decision-making is greater for publicly traded companies than private ones in France (Guery & Stevenot, 2017) and because ESO in Europe is more commonly observed in large companies than in smaller ones (Kruse, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

L'actionnariat salarié réduit-il les coûts d'agence ? Le cas des entreprises françaises cotées.

Joseph¹,

Nicolas²,

Campa³

2022

fcs

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HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

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“…We chose to focus on France because it is the European country with the largest proportion of employee-owned shares, the highest number of employee owners, and the highest level of employee-owner representation on boards of directors. We used listed firms because the effect of ESO on employee participation in company decisionmaking is greater for publicly traded companies than private ones in France (Guery & Stevenot, 2017) and because ESO in Europe is more commonly observed in large companies than in smaller ones (Kruse, 2016).…”

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confidence: 99%

Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies

Joseph¹,

Nicolas²,

Campa³

2022

fcs

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Employee stock ownership (ESO) is often associated with reductions in agency costs because it increases employee satisfaction and attachment to their company and aligns the interests of employees with those of their firm. Another stream of research argues that ESO may have the opposite effect on agency costs because it serves as a management entrenchment tool and leads to divergence between stakeholders. This paper examines the relationship between ESO and agency costs in France, which is a leading European country for ESO. Using a panel database of 125 firms over the period 2002–2016, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between ESO and agency costs. That evidence highlights that low levels of ESO increase agency costs, which is consistent with managerial entrenchment mechanisms. The findings also suggest that beyond a certain point, ESO reduces agency problems because it links employee wealth to their firm’s success.

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L’actionnariat salarié favorise-t-il la diffusion d’information aux salariés et leur participation aux décisions stratégiques ? Une question de gouvernance d’entreprise

Cited by 9 publications

References 42 publications

Employee ownership in China: new evidence

Employee ownership in China: new evidence

L'actionnariat salarié réduit-il les coûts d'agence ? Le cas des entreprises françaises cotées.

Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies

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