In a sticky price model with investment spending, recent research shows that inflation-forecast targeting interest rate policy makes determinacy of equilibrium essentially impossible. We examine a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy under interest rate policy that responds to a weighted average of an inflation forecast and current inflation. This condition demonstrates that the average-inflation targeting policy ensures determinacy as long as both the response to average inflation and the relative weight of current inflation are large enough. We also find that interest rate policy that responds solely to past inflation guarantees determinacy when its response satisfies the Taylor principle and is not large. These results still hold even when wages and hours worked are determined by Nash bargaining. JEL codes: E22, E24, E52 Keywords: inflation targeting interest rate policy, investment, indeterminacy of equilibrium, cost channel of monetary policy, labor bargaining.RECENT RESEARCH HAS shown that investment activity induces a critical implication for inflation targeting interest rate policy in sticky price models. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) derive a necessary condition for (local) determinacy of equilibrium in a Calvo-style (1983) sticky price model and find that inflation-forecast