Labor Unions and Support for Redistribution in an Era of Inequality*

Abstract

Objectives The United States has become increasingly unequal over the past several decades. Despite this, public opinion toward redistribution has remained largely unchanged. This is puzzling, given Americans' professed concern regarding, and knowledge of, rising inequality. I argue that the decline of labor unions, an organization that promotes anti‐inequality attitudes among its members, can help us to understand this. Method I use panel data from the 50 U.S. states from 1978 to 2012 and ordinary least squares regression to examine how state‐level unionization levels condition the relationship between income inequality and support for redistributive spending. Results I find that in contexts where labor unions are stronger, higher levels of income inequality prompt greater support for welfare spending. Conclusion These findings illustrate an additional mechanism through which labor unions can check income inequality and help us to understand why the American public has not turned in favor of redistribution during an era of rising economic inequality.

State Union Density Effects on Workers’ Support for Reducing Income Inequality, 1973-2016

“…Yet, other studies document negative regional union density effects on support for redistribution after controlling for individual union membership ( Mosimann and Pontusson 2017 ; Yang and Kwon 2019 ). In the US, some studies suggest that union density is positively associated with support for “liberal ideology” and education spending yet not welfare spending generally ( Franko 2016 ) while other studies show that union density is positively associated with support for welfare spending ( Macdonald 2019 ). These studies—stemming from different fields and methodological backgrounds—show a lack of consensus on union density effects across different indicators of SFRI.…”

“…However, existing research shows that union density effects on SFRI are largely mixed. State and country comparative studies show positive union density effects on average support for redistribution, while others show negative or mixed union density effects on other indicators of SFRI after controlling for demographic covariates and individual union membership (Kumlin and Svallfors 2008;Franko 2016;Mosimann and Pontusson 2017;Yang and Kwon 2019;Macdonald 2019) Results from Linear Probability Models (LPMs) and Fixed-Effects models show that after controlling for individual and state covariates, a large increase in state union density (23% union membership or 52 locals per 500,000 population) moderately increases workers' SFRI (by three to 12 percentage points). Testing this hypothesis is important because moral economy and Power Resource scholars, among others, argue that unions' capacity to foster attitudes helps explain their effects on market practices and welfare policy (Korpi 1983;Korpi 1985;Esping-Andersen 1990;Svallfors 2006;Western and Rosenfeld 2011).…”

“…While academics and some politicians recognize income inequality as an important social problem, average workers attitudes towards income inequality are also important for understanding inequality trends ( Western and Rosenfeld 2011 ; Lamont, Beljean and Clair 2014 ). Studies measure inequality attitudes from a variety of survey questions including support for income redistribution; support for tax progressivity or other welfare policy; and whether the income gap is too large ( Meltzer and Richard 1981 ; Milanovic 2000 ; McCall 2013 ; VanHeuvelen 2016 ; Macdonald 2019 ). While each question is unique, agreement with each suggests some support for reducing income inequality (hereafter shortened to SFRI).…”

“…However, existing research shows that union density effects on SFRI are largely mixed. State and country comparative studies show positive union density effects on average support for redistribution, while others show negative or mixed union density effects on other indicators of SFRI after controlling for demographic covariates and individual union membership ( Kumlin and Svallfors 2008 ; Franko 2016 ; Mosimann and Pontusson 2017 ; Yang and Kwon 2019 ; Macdonald 2019 ). Documenting this relationship is challenging because individual survey questions often fail to capture the nuance of inequality attitudes and are included in few survey waves.…”

The Political Economy of Populism

“…In practice, however, the redistribution strategy is limited for three reasons. First, not everyone with a low-wage job will readily accept social transfers, especially in an environment of declining unionization (Jacobs and Myers, 2014;Macdonald, 2019). Labor unions are often able to influence the political preferences of their members (Kim and Margalit, 2017), but a general decline in union membership means that their influence is less relevant today than it has ever been in the post-World War II period.…”