Lacking control – analysing the demand side of populist party support

Heinisch, Reinhard; Jansesberger, Viktoria

doi:10.1080/23745118.2022.2150027

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 81 publications

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“…Our research showed that emotions matter in radical right discursive strategies, as captured in the tweets of Tomio Okamura, Milan Uhrík, and Lászlo Toroczkai, starting with the outbreak of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Our study confirmed that negative emotions play an essential role in the discourse of RRPs in CEE (Salmela and von Scheve, 2017;Widmann, 2021Widmann, , 2022Heinisch and Jansesberger, 2022). However, the findings do not depict a universally transferable pattern.…”

Section: Discussing the Resultssupporting

confidence: 73%

“…In our case, the war in Ukraine may be a source of fear and Ukrainian migrants may be seen as an outgroup, arousing anger among CEE radical right voters and, therefore, becoming objects of negative emotional discourses by regional radical right leaders. The expected prevalence of negative emotions stems from the discursive tactic of the radical right of touching upon their voters' feelings of lack of control (Heinisch and Jansesberger, 2022). We can see that the literature offers good arguments and reasons to deal primarily with negative emotions such as anger and fear.…”

Section: Central Eastern Rrps As Transmitters Of Emotions: Theoretica...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Emotions of fear and anger as a discursive tool of radical right leaders in Central Eastern Europe

Hloušek,

Meislová,

Havlík

2024

Front. Polit. Sci.

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The paper examines how the radical right parties´ leaders work with emotions while addressing their voters and sympathizers on Twitter/X social media. We focus on the “supply side” on the level of leaders´ discourses. The goal is to demonstrate how they work with emotions, especially those of fear and anger. The context represents Russian aggression against Ukraine, because, typically, circumstances of a crisis bolster the ability of radical right leaders to use emotional rhetoric devices. Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia represent three particularly relevant and distinctive cases among the CEE countries according to the relevance, relative strength, and stability of radical right parties. We examined social media, particularly Twitter, since it is one of the most prominent tools of political communication today, especially for populists. We collected the data of all Tweets between February 24, 2022 and February 24, 2023. We combined a systematic quantitative content analysis with a more in-depth qualitative analysis of the key characteristics of the discursive construction of the two most salient emotions: anger and fear. We did not confirm the assumption that they would utilise the war in Ukraine since most tweets addressed issues related to domestic politics. The research, however, confirmed that despite differences, anger and fear play a substantial role in the emotional repertoire and represent necessary rhetorical devices. Our findings concur with the literature on radical right populism and its employment of emotional discourse. We found that even a crisis in international politics has been reframed primarily as a domestic issue and integrated into classical discursive practices.

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Section: Discussing the Resultssupporting

confidence: 73%

Section: Central Eastern Rrps As Transmitters Of Emotions: Theoretica...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Emotions of fear and anger as a discursive tool of radical right leaders in Central Eastern Europe

Hloušek,

Meislová,

Havlík

2024

Front. Polit. Sci.

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Generation Z: pessimistic and populist? A conjoint experiment on the determinants of populist voting in Spain

Zagórski,

Roch,

Tudó-Cisquella

et al. 2024

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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Generation Z is the most educated and yet pessimistic about the future. At the same time, populist parties have much support among young voters. Do they find an answer to their discouraging socio-economic situation in populist appeals? In this article, we analyse how pessimistic economic expectations shape the preference for populist parties among the young in Spain. By using conjoint experiments, we explore which specific features of populist parties (‘thin’ or ‘thick’ characteristics) are decisive in attracting young and pessimistic voters. Unlike older generations, for whom immigration is the most relevant factor, Generation Z, especially the pessimistic, focuses more on the thin ideological elements of populism. This finding contradicts previous experimental studies, which argue that thin populist characteristics are irrelevant in explaining the general population’s voting behaviour. Ideology plays a significant mediating role, as young pessimists on the left tend to be attracted by anti-elitism, while those on the centre-right by people-centrism.

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The strange bedfellows of populism and liberalism: the effect of populist attitudes on the perception of the COVID-19 pandemic and policies to contain it

Heinisch,

Werner

2023

Comp Eur Polit

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The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on everyday life, where people feel affected both economically and health-wise by the spread of the novel virus, regardless of whether they have contracted it or not. At the same time, we know that populist attitudes influence how people perceive their individual situation, the political environment, and available policy solutions. Are these two factors interrelated? This article examines the role that populist attitudes play (a) in subjective feelings of being affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and (b) in choosing policies to counteract its spread. Populist attitudes may lead people to reject the policy-making process during the COVID-19 pandemic, shaped primarily by experts. The article argues that this should increase the sense of concern among people with populist orientations and lead to a rejection of commonly discussed policies to contain the virus. To test this connection empirically, we conducted a representative survey in Austria in September 2020. Our analysis shows a significant and substantive correlation between populist attitudes and the subjective feeling of being affected by the crisis in the areas of health and the economy. Similarly, we find evidence that populist attitudes affect the acceptability of policies to combat the spread of COVID-19. These findings indicate that populist attitudes have such strong effects on individuals’ perception of the world that they even influence the perception of the globally shared challenge of a pandemic.

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Lacking control – analysing the demand side of populist party support

Cited by 7 publications

References 81 publications

Emotions of fear and anger as a discursive tool of radical right leaders in Central Eastern Europe

Emotions of fear and anger as a discursive tool of radical right leaders in Central Eastern Europe

Generation Z: pessimistic and populist? A conjoint experiment on the determinants of populist voting in Spain

The strange bedfellows of populism and liberalism: the effect of populist attitudes on the perception of the COVID-19 pandemic and policies to contain it

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