Land for Housing: A Political Resource – Reflections from Zimbabwe’s Urban Areas

Abstract

When the Zimbabwean government launched the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 1999, an international outcry followed, with Zimbabwe described as an international pariah state. Zimbabwe entered a prolonged socio-economic and political crisis. While conventional opposition attacks the FTLRP for its negative impacts on agriculture, food security and economic growth, this article argues that the programme has also had widespread impacts on access to housing land. Over the years, the main political tool used by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU [PF]) was land, especially in rural areas. Later, especially in urban and peri-urban areas, ZANU(PF) used peri-urban farms to bolster its waning support in the urban constituencies. Through ZANU(PF)-aligned co-operatives and land barons, the party became a major player in deciding who had access to land for housing. On the other hand, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) tried to use its majority control of urban areas to give its supporters land for housing, albeit with limited success. MDC-controlled urban administrations were incapacitated, as most urban land was under a de facto ZANU(PF) administration. This article focuses in particular on the allocation of housing land between 2000 and 2012 in Zimbabwe's major cities. The ZANU(PF) approach to housing bypassed urban planning regulations, with catastrophic effects on urban infrastructure planning. Further, the article explains developments in council-led housing and the role of non-council actors in housing provision. The Zimbabwean experience shows that it is not enough for a political party to be voted into power; rather, controlling resources such as land is a vital consideration in urban governance and development.

Frontiers of Urban Control: Lawlessness on the City Edge and Forms of Clientalist Statecraft in Zimbabwe

“…Below we explore the official discourses and audits that cast these spaces as “lawless, regulatory voids”, and which legitimated new forms of central state intervention. Regularisation provoked new conflicts within the ruling party, adding to older patterns of inter‐party rivalry emphasised in the existing literature (Kamete , , ; Muchadenyika ). Although official discourse cast the effort to close the “void” as a battle between professional planners and criminals, we interpret it rather as shedding light on conflicts over different types of clientalist statecraft.…”

“…His work has helped respond to calls for political economy insights into why public institutions in African cities lack capacity and fail to capture land and property values (Monkham and Moore ; Palmer and Berrisford ; Turok ). It emphasises the heightened importance of urban land and property as bases for accumulation in Africa, where urbanisation is occurring without concurrent industrialisation (Goodfellow ; Pitcher ; on Harare, see Chirisa et al ; Mbiba ; Muchadenyika ). But in Harare—and elsewhere—urban patronage economies are not just about capturing land values, but are also about capturing votes (on “votebank” politics in South Asia, see Bayat ; Roy ; on Harare, see Muchadenyika ).…”

“…It emphasises the heightened importance of urban land and property as bases for accumulation in Africa, where urbanisation is occurring without concurrent industrialisation (Goodfellow ; Pitcher ; on Harare, see Chirisa et al ; Mbiba ; Muchadenyika ). But in Harare—and elsewhere—urban patronage economies are not just about capturing land values, but are also about capturing votes (on “votebank” politics in South Asia, see Bayat ; Roy ; on Harare, see Muchadenyika ). While Goodfellow () relates different varieties of clientalism to specific national political settlements, we use “frontier” to provide insight into conflicting forms of patron‐clientelage within one city context.…”

“…During the Government of National Unity (2008–2013), formed between ZANUPF and the opposition MDC parties, land occupations became a “stampede”, as politicians offered urban land for votes in the run up to the 2013 elections (Mbiba ; McGregor ; Muchadenyika ). Although MDC politicians and councillors also rewarded supporters by leading occupations and allocating land to cooperatives registered with the City, this was small scale, given the City’s lack of control over land or support from coercive arms of the state.…”

“…The case study clearly demonstrates the “mythical” quality of officials’ rhetorical claims to state absence, as the regulatory “voids” we discuss originated through layers of central state intervention—via land reform, housing and cooperative development policies. Control over land on the city’s periphery was central to ZANUPF’s strategy for attempting to win votes and to undermine MDC‐led urban municipalities (Kamete , ; Mbiba ; McGregor ; Muchadenyika ; Muchadenyika and Williams ). The context was one of repression of the political opposition and civic organisations, and state institutions were militarised, securitised and brought under party control.…”