Land grievances and the mobilization of electoral violence

Abstract

Recent studies have asked why elites resort to violence, yet many overlook the process and dynamics of mobilizing violence. How do politicians convince their supporters to fight? This article argues that in multi-ethnic and democratizing societies where land and property rights are weak and politicized, land grievances can provide leaders with a powerful tool to organize electoral violence. We develop a theory to show how land grievances can give rise to violent mobilization when leaders frame elections as a threat to the land security of supporters or an opportunity to reclaim land or strengthen land rights. Conversely, land grievances are ineffective when citizens do not believe that elections signal a credible threat to their land security or an opportunity to strengthen land rights. We further specify how the type of land grievance shapes the logic and form of violent action. Grievances based on land insecurity shape a preemptive logic of violence, while grievances based on competing land claims often shape an opportunistic logic of electoral violence. The article examines the validity of our theory using a comparative case study between zones of escalation and non-escalation of violence during post-electoral crises in Kenya (2007-08) and Côte d'Ivoire (2010-11). By observing the variation between positive and negative cases, the article identifies factors that foment and constrain the mobilization of election violence.

Deciphering ‘Sons of the Soil’ Conflicts: A Critical Survey of the Literature

“…Recent studies have shown how the ambiguous and contested nature of property rights regimes has enabled political elites to mobilize supporters by playing upon the land issue-particularly through electoral politics (Boone, 2009;Boone, 2014;Klaus & Mitchell, 2015;Onoma, 2010). In a context where claims to land are easily disputed owing to a weak and/or insecure property rights regime, land becomes a major cleavage issue pitting locals against migrants.…”

“…In a context where claims to land are easily disputed owing to a weak and/or insecure property rights regime, land becomes a major cleavage issue pitting locals against migrants. And yet as comparative research on SoS conflicts and elections reveals, politicians are much less likely to attempt to instrumentalize the issue of property rights when there is mutual agreement around the norms and practices embodied in the property rights regime operating within local communities (Côté & Mitchell, 2015;Klaus & Mitchell, 2015). In contexts where land rights and ownership have been highly regulated and controlled by local traditional authorities (i.e.…”

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“…Although the 2015 elections were peaceful, issues underpinning the social turmoil that led to conflict in the recent past -namely land grievances and identity politics -have not yet been addressed meaningfully and continue to pose challenges to Côte d'Ivoire's democratic development (Klaus and Mitchell 2015;Whitaker 2015). Tests for Côte d'Ivoire's democratic consolidation continue into the future, when election years might occur during years of economic decline or stagnation, which would create a starker trade-off for incumbents between electoral defeat and free and fair elections.…”

The effect of alternation in power on electoral intimidation in democratizing regimes

“…Elections in democratizing regimes have been found to be more vulnerable to violence than those held in either fully democratic or fully authoritarian states (Klaus & Mitchell, 2015;Mochtak, 2016). There are several possible reasons for this: the fragility of democratic institutions in countries 4 moving towards democracy means that democratic governance may not be entirely accepted by all actors in the electoral arena as the only game in town.…”